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ABSTRACT

Household production is the result of inputs from a variety of members, each of
whom contains overlapping but non-identical interests. This dissertation explores the
conditions under which the division of labor and the allocation of household resources
precipitates parent-offspring and spousal conflict. This broad goal is addressed through
three specific goals: 1) to identify factors affecting variation in the likelihood of task
delegation to children and resistance toward performing delegated tasks; 2) to understand
how variation in household labor demand influences children’s time allocation,
considering ways in which behavioral manipulation might compromise the child’s future
prospects; and 3) to understand the causes and consequences of men’s diverted
investment in offspring. Common to each of these issues is the recognition that
individuals often face a trade-off between investing in ego- versus family-directed
pursuits, and that the costs and benefits of familial investment will change in response to
specific individual and familial circumstances. Taken together, results show that at times
self-interest pervades relations of even the closest of kin. This highlights a need for the
development of models of family behavior that incorporate children and parents as
effective decision-makers capable of influencing outcomes with respect to converging
and diverging goals.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The family is an organizational feature found in every culture (Brown, 1991).
Close kin are distinguished from more distant kin through language and nepotistic
behavior, linking individuals in nuclear families characterized by a division of labor.
Indeed, anthropological research on the family from a life history perspective often
focuses on outcomes of collaborative familial pursuits (e.g., food consumption through
sharing, time allocation to production). Considerably less attention has been given to the
process of how individuals actually decide which activities to engage in on a daily basis
and how best to allocate time and resources given overlapping but non-identical interests
of household members. Since collaborative activities can involve disputes until an
outcome is observed, exploring the conditions under which those disputes arise will shed
light on the causes of diverging interests between close kin and provide a broader and
more realistic understanding of human family dynamics.
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to explore the conditions under which
the division of labor and the allocation of household resources results in parent-offspring
and spousal conflict. This broad goal is addressed through three specific goals: 1) to
identify factors affecting variation in the likelihood of task delegation to children and
resistance toward performing delegated tasks; 2) to understand how variation in
household labor demand influences children’s time allocation, considering ways in which
behavioral manipulation might compromise the child’s future prospects; and 3) to
understand the causes and consequences of men’s diverted investment in offspring.
Common to each of these issues is the recognition that individuals often face a trade-off
between investing in ego- versus family-directed pursuits, and that the costs and benefits
of familial investment will change in response to specific individual and familial
circumstances.

Human Life History and Intrafamilial Division of Labor
Several features of hunter-gatherer lifeways are responsible for the pervasiveness
of the division of labor by age and sex. First, human infants are highly altricial and
require almost constant attention and care throughout the first few years of life. The need
1

for such care lowers the efficiency of foraging mothers (Hurtado et al., 1992). Because
offspring remain nutritionally dependent until their late teens, adults into their 50s must
provide for several dependents of different ages simultaneously. Even at ages of peak
production, adults are unable to provision families by themselves due to the compound
net demands of offspring (Gurven and Walker, 2006; Lee and Kramer, 2002). To help
offset these consumption requirements parents rely on contributions from older coresident children and other kin, increasing the benefits of resource sharing to enhance
economic efficiency. This places a premium on establishing residential networks
composed of nuclear and extended kin to facilitate labor and resource exchange.
Another feature promoting a division of labor concerns the varied composition of
forager diets and food acquisition strategies. A complement of lipids, proteins, and
carbohydrates are necessary for growth, maintenance, and reproduction. Plant diets are
high in carbohydrates but lack many essential micronutrients and are low in fats and
proteins. Fats and proteins are usually harder to acquire and more valuable in the sense
that they significantly constrain brain growth, immune function development, and female
fecundity (e.g., Frisch, 1987). Women in forager-horticulturalist societies often express
complaints to husbands over insufficient quantities of meat or fish in the household; such
remarks over shortages of cultigens or other edible plant or vegetable products are
relatively unusual.
Food acquisition strategies should target a combination of carbohydrates, proteins,
fats, and micronutrients for optimal somatic functioning. Because nutrients are found in
different foods, forager diets must be diverse. Humans utilize a variety of techniques to
obtain such foods, each of which requires different levels of skill and strength. Foods
that are difficult to acquire comprise a substantial portion of the diet in many forager
societies (Kaplan et al., 2000), raising the payoffs to investment in learning and
contributing to the long period of offspring dependency. While certain tasks require
greater levels of size rather than skill to attain adult-level productivity (e.g., Bird and
Bliege Bird, 2002; Tucker and Young, 2005), hunting proficiency increases long after
strength declines. The fact that peak hunting return rates are achieved about 20 years
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following peaks in strength and time allocation to hunting indicates that substantial time
investments are necessary to achieve the greater future returns.
Given that multiple food acquisition strategies are required to meet consumption
demands, and given that some strategies entail large investments in specific knowledge
providing increasing future returns, household members will specialize in different types
of familial investment to maximize efficiency. Even if household members were
identical in their intrinsic abilities, specialization through the division of complementary
forms of labor will maximize production by increasing efficiency of task performance and
utilizing economies of scale (Becker, 1991). Individuals will specialize in tasks for
which they have a comparative advantage, and time allocation will reflect differences
between household members in levels of skill and strength (Gurven and Kaplan, 2006).
Children are therefore expected to substitute for parental labor while parents engage in
work that youngsters do not yet have the necessary skills and/or strength to perform. Due
to the importance of investment in skill acquisition for future productivity, children will
also engage in non-productive activities such as play that are safer and impart more skills
than would time spent working due to small body size. When the child’s labor is
required, “the level of responsibility assigned to children is a facultative
adaptation…although it is always compatible with play (Konner 2005:62).”

Evolutionary Theory and Family Conflict
Parents and offspring have different interests with respect to the allocation of
resources used for reproduction. All else equal, parents are equally related to all children
and selected to balance resource allocation among current and future offspring. The
child, however, is only partially related to siblings but fully related to itself and is
therefore selected to solicit parental investment at the expense of its siblings (Trivers,
1974). Recent behavioral and physiological evidence suggests that children indeed
attempt to garner limited parental resources at the expense of siblings (Fouts et al., 2005;
Haig, 2002; McDade, 2001). Of course, all is rarely equal and biasing investment in one
child at the expense of others will yield greater fitness returns to the parent in certain
ecological circumstances (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; Cronk, 2000; Quinlan, 2006). These
3

exceptions highlight the fact that selection has favored parental strategies less concerned
with the interests of a particular child and more concerned with maximizing returns on
investment to the parent.
In traditional societies, childhood is characterized by the solicitation of investment
but also by increases in time allocation to work and efficiency as skills are acquired and
strength increases with age. Parent-offspring conflict theory implies that parents and
children will disagree over the degree of altruism exhibited by children toward siblings.
Manifestations of discord are likely to include disputes over household labor allocation
because the child’s labor directly influences household resource availability and thus
parental fitness. This leads to the following general hypotheses:

H1. Parent-offspring conflict is more likely to occur over productive tasks that have
fewer positive effects on parental fitness.

H2. Family labor demand will be positively associated with the degree of parental
manipulation of the child’s time.

These hypotheses are a useful heuristic device. However, a detailed consideration
of the costs and benefits of familial investment and how they change over time is required
to incorporate converging and diverging interests that will influence the extent of parentoffspring conflict over the allocation of labor. From an empirical standpoint, the
difficulty lies in isolating the window in which altruistic optima differ given relatedness
asymmetries between parent and child and between siblings.
Short-term benefits of the child’s labor include the provisioning of resources/care
that increases the probability of survival of the focal child and/or that of its relatives.
Long-term benefits of the child’s labor include skills acquired during task performance
that will increase future productivity. Short-term costs of the child’s labor include
foregone production from other work, energy expenditure, and potential safety risks
incurred during task performance (e.g., snakebites or heat exhaustion from garden labor).
Long-term costs of the child’s labor include the inability to acquire other skills. Tasks
4

minimizing costs and maximizing benefits will be favored from both the parent and
child’s perspective and therefore minimize conflict. These include safe, low exertion
activities that simultaneously benefit kin and facilitate relevant skill acquisition. This
likely explains the pervasiveness of allomaternal investment in traditional societies by
older sisters. Under specific circumstances, however, conflict will be expected when the
benefits of the child’s labor exceed the costs from the parent’s perspective but not the
child’s. The costs and benefits of kin-directed altruism to the child and its parents will
therefore be a major influence regarding children’s decisions over which activities to
engage in on a daily basis and the parent’s decisions regarding how best to structure the
child’s time.
Spouses also have different reproductive interests due to asymmetries in parental
investment (Trivers, 1972). Among sexually reproducing species females produce more
energetically expensive gametes and almost always invest greater amounts of time and
energy in offspring than males. Female reproductive success is limited by access to
resources critical for reproduction whereas male reproductive success is constrained by
access to fertile females. Among most mammals, male investment in reproduction is
limited to mating effort rather than parenting effort. Unlike most mammals, humans form
long-term pair bonds characterized by high levels of investment from males in the
energetics of reproduction. Explanations for such investment have focused on whether
the fitness payoffs of men’s resource acquisition and distribution strategies represent
mating or parenting effort (reviewed in Gurven and Hill, 2009). The great variation
observed within and across cultures in levels of men’s mating and parenting effort in
similar familial circumstances suggests that decisions underlying household resource
allocation are the result of a complex negotiation process between spouses that varies in
response to local ecology.

Models of Household Decision-making
How can we reconcile ego-based approaches to the study of human behavior with
the reality that humans make decisions in a broader cooperative context? Two general
views have emerged in economics, which differ in the extent to which they recognize
5

conflicting preferences of family members. According to the common preference view
the family is a single decision-making unit. Production of individual family members is
pooled, whether by consensus or the dominance of a single individual. Behavior is thus
governed by the family’s total production rather than the production of any household
member. This model implies that resource use is independent of the producer’s identity
or the individual controlling resource allocation. In other words, an increase in the ability
to direct production for personal rather than familial gain is not expected to alter resource
distribution. Purely selfish individuals will act altruistically because it is in their best
interests to do so (Becker, 1991) and the scant empirical attention paid to divergent
preferences is given theoretical justification.
Yet the pervasiveness of harmful family relations across cultures suggests that
family behavior can be highly inefficient. Another general view stresses that spouses
have divergent interests that require negotiation (children are generally not included as
decision-makers). A series of bargaining models have been proposed which vary in their
outcomes in the absence of spousal agreement and include divorce or some
noncooperative outcome within marriage (reviewed in Lundberg and Pollak, 1996).
Unlike the common preference view, there is no appeal to the assumption of income
pooling in these classes of models. As a result, differential control of resources by
husbands and wives will influence family behavior if this control affects the value of
alternatives to marital cooperation.
Few anthropological studies have employed bargaining models to investigate
spousal dynamics. There is evidence that inequalities in bargaining power increase the
risk of intimate partner violence against women, which might serve to restrict the wife’s
options outside of marriage (Holland Jones and Ferguson, 2009) or facilitate resource
flows to the husband from the wife’s family following marriage (Bloch and Rao, 2002).
Gurven et al. (2009) find little consistent evidence that leverage influences the trade-off
to men of investing in ego- versus family-directed pursuits, but note the confound in their
operationalization of bargaining power (relative mate value) and work effort.
No attempt is made here to apply such models to the study of spousal relations.
Instead we utilize the insight from evolutionary and micro-economic theory that divergent
6

spousal interests over the proper use of family resources will increase the risk of
employing coercive tactics. This leads to the following general hypothesis:

H3. Spousal violence against women is the result of men’s redistribution of familial
resources to enhance fertility at the expense of investment in offspring.

Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized is as follows. The ethnographic setting is
introduced in chapter two. In chapter three, parent-offspring conflict over the allocation
of household labor is examined. Chapter four addresses the effect of variation in
household labor demand on children’s time use and explores implications of these
findings with respect to collaborative and conflictive kin dynamics. In chapter five, the
relationship between household demography, spousal conflict, resource allocation, and
violence against women is considered. A summary of findings and conclusion is
presented in chapter six.
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CHAPTER 2: THE ETHNOGRAPHIC SETTING

Introduction
Fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted by a team of researchers in 10
Tsimane’ communities from 2002 to 2008. Data analyzed in chapter three were collected
by JS and three Tsimane’ research assistants in Cedral, Chacal, Puerto Triumfo, and
Misión Fatima; data analyzed in chapter four were collected by JS and eight other
investigators in Aperecito, Cuverene, Cosincho, Munday, Tacuaral del Matto, and
Jamanchi Uno; finally, data analyzed in chapter five were collected by JS and another
Tsimane’ research assistant in the Beni Biosphere Reserve.
The Tsimane’ are a natural fertility population of forager-farmers inhabiting the
rainforests and savannas located between the towns of San Borja and San Ignacio de
Moxos in the Beni department of central lowland Bolivia. Published census estimates
range from 6,351 (INE, 2003) to about 7,130 (VAIPO, 1998). Tsimane’ territory spans
roughly 1.35 million hectares (CIDDEBENI, 1990) yielding a population density of 0.47
– 0.53 individuals/km². About 60 villages are dispersed along the banks of the Maniqui
River, and another 30 or so communities are settled along the headwaters of the Cuvirene,
Matto, Yacuma, Apere, and Sécure rivers. Villages vary in their exposure to the market
economy and range in size from roughly 60 to 400 individuals.

History
Very little is known about the Tsimane’ prior to the arrival of Europeans in the
16th century. There is evidence that tropical forest chiefdoms existed within their territory
(Denevan, 1966). It is unclear, however, whether the Tsimane’ adhered to this political
system. The Tsimane’ experienced first contact with Europeans during brief forays by the
Spanish into their region, but due to relatively severe living conditions Europeans
refrained from establishing long-term settlements in the area until the 17th century.
A Franciscan priest named Gregorio de Bolivar first tried, unsuccessfully, to
convert the Tsimane’ to Catholicism in 1621 (Chiccon, 1992). In 1668 Jesuits settled in
present-day Beni and established over 25 missions throughout the region over the next
8

several decades, including San Francisco de Borja in 1693. Now known as San Borja, the
town contains a population of nearly 20,000 and provides Tsimane’ with access to market
goods and a headquarters for the Gran Consejo, the main political association of the
Tsimane’. While the Jesuits were more successful than their Franciscan counterparts at
establishing long-term settlements in the region, they were ultimately expelled from
Bolivia in 1767 and failed to permanently sedentize the Tsimane’. Those Tsimane’ who
were converted by the Jesuits in the 17th century later developed into a related ethnic
group known as the Moseten (Aldazabal, 1988). Metraux (1948) alludes to the Tsimane’
under various names such as the Chimanisa, Chumano, and Nawazi-Moñtji, similarly
noting their close association to the Moseten. There is currently co-residence and some
intermarriage between the Tsimane’ and Moseten, particularly in communities in the
Pilón Lajas Reserve, and each group considers the other as a relative. Furthermore,
Tsimane’ and Moseten form a linguistic group in the Awaruna family that shares a
similar vocabulary and is isolated from other lowland Bolivian or South American
language families (Byron, 2003; Reyes-Garcia, 2001).
Bolivia was granted independence from Spain in 1825. The department of Beni
was founded 17 years later in an attempt to develop the region and encourage its
integration with the remainder of the country. Migration into the region rapidly increased
toward the end of the 19th century when economic pursuits arose from the extraction of
natural resources that included rubber, vanilla, and cocoa. While indigenous peoples
throughout Beni and other parts of South America were exploited for their labor,
particularly as rubber tappers, the Tsimane’ were not greatly involved in such activities.
This was primarily due to a paucity of rubber trees within their territory coupled with the
dispersed settlement patterns of the Tsimane’, precluding foreigners to easily recruit
laborers (Chiccon, 1992).
The rapid population increases in the region beginning in the 1880s resulted in a
greater demand for beef which then spurred the growth of cattle ranching. After the
rubber boom ended in 1912, ranching became the major industry in Beni and continues to
be the chief economic activity for those living around San Borja today. Rising beef prices
throughout Bolivia in the 1940s, the establishment of air transport in Beni to help meet
9

national demands for meat soon afterward, and agrarian reform laws enacted in 1953
encouraging development of Bolivia’s tropical lowlands, jointly made cattle ranching a
lucrative and enduring pursuit (Reyes-Garcia, 2001). The creation of roadways in the
mid-1970s that linked Beni to Bolivia’s larger cities helped sustain the already
burgeoning ranching industry while attracting loggers, farmers, and other businessmen
who continue to provide a sporadic source of wage labor for the Tsimane’.
The economic and political events of the 20th century that had lasting impacts on
the region were accompanied by religious changes. In the 1950s, Catholic missionaries
returned to Beni and created a Redemptorist mission at Cara Cara that was later moved
farther up the Maniqui River and renamed Misiόn Fatima. A few unsuccessful attempts
were made by Father Martin Bauer to develop the economy of the area mainly through
cattle ranching and cash-cropping of coffee and cocoa. Father Bauer also created a health
post and school, but his death in 1997 ended the mission’s influence outside of Fatima
and the surrounding villages.
Around the same time that Redemptorists began to establish a presence in the
territory, Evangelical New Tribes missionaries also started forging relationships with the
Tsimane’. Formerly known as the Summer Institute of Linguistics, this organization has
translated the Bible into Tsimane’ and many other indigenous languages across Latin
America. Among the Tsimane’, the New Tribes Mission is responsible for training
bilingual Spanish-Tsimane’ teachers and health promoters, developing a thorough
Tsimane’ dictionary and orthography in Spanish and English that is used by
anthropologists, and helping the Tsimane’ establish the Gran Consejo governing body in
1989 (Ellis and Gonzalo, 1998). The current headquarters of the New Tribes
missionaries in the region, HOREB, is located just outside central San Borja and serves
the Tsimane’ community by providing medical care and food, and broadcasting daily
religious and secular radio programs in the Tsimane’ language.
Environment and Economy
The Tsimane’ inhabit the Ballivian and Yacuma provinces of Beni in the Amazon
basin. Their territory stretches from the Andean foothills northeast to the Moxos, ranging
in habitat from wet to moist sub-tropical and gallery forests, some of which are adjacent
10

to savannas. Elevation varies from 150 to 500 meters above sea level, which affects soil
quality and the diversity and distribution of flora in the region (Reyes-Garcia, 2001). The
climate can be categorized into “wet” (November to April) and “dry” (May to October)
seasons, but there is a fair amount of variation in rainfall within the seasons. The average
annual temperature is 26º Celsius.
Major horticultural crops include plantains (pe’re), sweet manioc (o’yi), corn
(tara), and rice (arrosh). Rice is the only cultigen with substantial market value.
Tsimane’ often sell rice by the quintal (~46 kg) in San Borja following the wet season
harvest. Unlike corn, manioc, and rice, whose availability is determined by seasonal
cycles, plantains are harvested throughout the entire year. Plantains are the major
carbohydrate staple but corn and manioc also play important dietary and social roles. The
latter two are usually consumed in the form of fermented homemade beer (shocdye’) at
intimate or communal gatherings. Alternatively, corn and manioc may be ground into a
fine flour and eaten raw or baked into flat bread.
Minor crops include sugar cane, coffee, onion, squash, watermelon, chocolate,
mango, peanut, garlic, hot pepper, potato, and various citrus fruits, many of which were
introduced by Jesuit missionaries upon arrival to the region. The Tsimane’ also grow
several species of medicinal and other plants in house gardens used for fishing, dyes and
fibers, treating illnesses, and as contraceptives. Tobacco and coca are sometimes grown
for recreational purposes, as well as for occasional bartering with loggers or merchants.
The Tsimane’ remove brush and fell trees using steel machetes and axes during
the dry season, usually clearing an area ranging from 0.1 to 1.5 hectares. Households in
villages located closer to market towns deforest more land than their more remote
counterparts (Vadez et al., 2004). Once undergrowth is removed and trees are felled, the
field is left to dry for several weeks before burning begins. Once burned, fields are
partially cleared and then planted. Weeding generally takes place a couple of times prior
to the harvesting season. After one or two seasons of cultivation, a plot is left fallow.
For any given household, this method of cultivation results in a number of plots under
different stages of use and condition. Rice and corn are usually the first to be planted,
followed by manioc, plantains, and some other minor crops mentioned above.
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Men play the largest role in preparing fields. Adult women and children often
help in chopping brush and burning, but the task of felling trees is almost exclusively
done by men. Once fields are planted they are left to be watered by rain. Tsimane’
women participate more in the harvesting of crops and their processing, often receiving
assistance from children of both sexes.
Reliance on foods gathered from the forest varies throughout the year as different
fruits come into season. Edible forest fruits include several species of palm fruit, pacay,
honey, and wild cacao. The Tsimane’ also use a suite of forest plants for house
construction (mainly cajtafa or shuru), tool manufacture, craft production, jewelry, and
medicines.
Villages vary in access to major rivers, but fish plays an important role in
Tsimane’ subsistence (especially during the dry season). Unlike hunting which is almost
always performed by men, fishing is practiced by men, women, and children. The
Tsimane’ utilize numerous tools and tactics to acquire fish, including hook and line, bow
and arrow, machetes, fishing nets or mosquiteros, and poisons during communal barbasco
events. This latter technique appears to provide the highest return rates across all types of
fishing, but the Beni Biosphere Reserve has recently pressured the Tsimane’ into
restricting their use of barbasco in the Maniqui River due to fish depletion. Two of the
most commonly caught fish are sábalo (Prochiludus nigricans) and benton (Hoplias
malabaricus).
Hunting is the main source of protein and is performed in open savannas, gallery
forests, and forested islands formed during the wet season. Time allocation to hunting
increases during the wet season. Men usually leave the community alone or in small
groups of two or three early in the morning and return late in the afternoon. Night
hunting with flashlights is also fairly common. Sometimes larger parties, including
women and children, accompany men on hunting, fishing, and gathering treks into the
forest spanning several days. Informal comparisons of the distances men travel to hunt
suggest that communities located closer to market towns have experienced drastic
declines in surrounding game densities. During our 2005 field season in the marketintegrated village of Tacuaral del Matto, men almost never left the community to hunt on
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foot. Instead they used bicycles and often spent over 12 hours outside of the village. In
contrast, it was not uncommon for men living in the Beni Reserve (where logging is
prohibited) to leave on foot at sunrise and return with meat by noon.
In descending order, the most important species taken by total biomass include
collared peccary, Brazilian tapir, gray brocket deer, howler monkey, agouti paca, whitefaced capuchin monkey, and coatimundi (Gurven et al., 2006). Other species making
smaller contributions to the diet are white-lipped peccary, several monkey species (e.g.,
brown capuchin, squirrel, spider), collared and giant anteaters, tortoises, and seven- and
nine-banded armadillos.
Firearms are preferred weapons among hunters, although bows and arrows are still
employed in the more remote villages. Older men often prefer using shotguns due to their
lesser dependence on acute vision. The use of hunting dogs is also common but varies
according to targeted game species. For instance, dogs are useful for tracking certain
animals such as agouti paca, but they are considered to be an obstruction for hunting
monkeys. Although meat is usually eaten directly after processing and cooking, it is
sometimes smoked or preserved with salt.
The Tsimane’ also engage in occasional market activity. Prior to the influx of
ranchers, loggers, and other businessmen into the Beni region beginning in the late 19th
century, the Tsimane’ earned cash mainly through the sale or exchange of forest goods or
cultigens. The manufacture of roofing panels made from jatata palm collected in the
forest remains an important source of income for Tsimane’ inhabiting the middle and
upper Maniqui region. Over the past few decades wage labor opportunities have greatly
increased with loggers and ranchers, as has the amount of market goods consumed by the
Tsimane’. Sugar, salt, clothing, medicines, metal pots, cooking oil, utensils, flour, and
school supplies are popular items purchased from itinerant river merchants or during trips
to San Borja. Men begin wage labor at around age 15 and a typical daily salary is 25
Bolivianos (about $3.50 USD).
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Marriage and Family Relations
Tsimane’ villages are composed of household clusters, each of which typically
contains three or four residences of consanguineal and affinal kin. Within each cluster,
households cooperate in nearly all economic pursuits and the extended family is the
cornerstone of sociality. Tsimane’ kinship has been classified as Dravidian, favoring
endogamous cross-cousin marriage. While there are no formal rules of post-marital
residence, newly married couples often reside near the wife’s natal kin for at least a few
years. During this time the husband is expected to work with affinal kin in daily
subsistence tasks, although bride service is not officially recognized. After several years
the couple and their joint children may or may not relocate to live near the husband’s
relatives.
Although marriages are often facilitated by kin, women do not face divorce
restrictions. Tsimane’ marriages are stable, with about 20% of unions in our sample
resulting in divorce. Mean age of marriage for men and women is 22 and 17,
respectively. While there are no restrictions against polygyny, only 9% of men in our
sample were married to two women simultaneously. Sororal polygyny constitutes the
vast majority of such cases. Similar estimates for ages of marriage and the prevalence of
divorce and polygyny among the Tsimane’ are reported elsewhere (Winking, 2005;
Winking et al., 2007). The Tsimane’ do not participate in official wedding ceremonies,
but informal gatherings of family members are common to celebrate the affair. At these
events large quantities of homemade beer are prepared and domestic chickens or ducks
are usually slaughtered for communal consumption.
Spouses engage in extensive cooperation on a daily basis and sex roles are welldefined. Women exert considerable domestic control and are generally responsible for
providing childcare, cooking and processing food, cleaning in/around the house, washing
clothes, preparing beer, delegating household tasks to children (see chapter three), and
weaving bags, floor mats, fans, and baskets. Men acquire game and fish, engage in wage
labor, construct houses, and manufacture bows, arrows, and canoes. Both sexes collect
forest foods, fetch firewood and water, participate in horticultural labor, and manufacture
roof panels using palm leaves.
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The complementary relationships between Tsimane’ spouses contain their share of
conflict. For men, frequent complaints about wives generally regard the timely
completion of everyday domestic tasks such as cooking, washing clothes of household
members, gathering water/firewood, and making beer. Instead of performing these tasks
women are usually engaged in other work or visiting kin. The latter represents another
common male complaint (25% of respondents listed wife’s visitation of co-resident kin as
a frequent cause of conflict without being prompted). Squabbles over visitation of
relatives are not confined to co-resident kin – spouses argue over visiting in-laws in other
communities to help clear fields, care for newly born children, deliver money for San
Borja hospital trips, or other reasons. These arguments undoubtedly underscore larger
disputes over residence decisions, especially since women are more favorably treated by
husbands when consanguineal kin live in close proximity (see chapter five). Both men
and women express reluctance to assist extended kin: 36% of women and 30% of men
complained to a spouse in the month prior to interviews over a partner’s refusal to help an
affine, whether they lived in the same community or not.
Men also express dissatisfaction with the quality of care provided to children.
Most childcare complaints are directed at wives for either allowing children to get too
dirty (by crawling or eating dirt), or physically punishing disobedient children too
severely. Vindictive mother- or sister-in-laws might also spread rumors about a woman
treating her children poorly. Unlike husbands’ complaints though, such gossip is not
usually employed to encourage childcare but rather motivate wives to cooperate with
affines (e.g., extending invitations to visit, sharing food, etc.).
Although not one man admitted it during interviews, sexual jealousy likely
precipitates a fair number of complaints to wives. Nearly 40% of women stated that a
common complaint by husbands concerned illicit relations with a perceived boyfriend or
ex-husband (without being prompted). Women also claimed that 17% of all female
partner-directed violence occurred because a husband expressed concern over the wife’s
sexual infidelity (see chapter five). Finally, 43% of men admitted to entertaining
thoughts of a wife’s sexual misconduct in the year prior to interviews. Whether men’s
concerns over a partner’s extramarital sexual exploits are valid or even sincere, however,
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is another question. Of those men who acknowledged having ideas about a wife’s affairs,
only 13% were actually able to provide a potential lover’s name, both of whom were exhusbands of their wives living in distant communities.
In contrast, 66% of female respondents admitted to entertaining thoughts of a
husband’s extramarital affairs in the year prior to interviews, with 63% providing names
of alleged mistresses. Women frequently accuse men of having girlfriends and
complaints over men’s lovers in the community, in other villages, and/or in San Borja are
common. Oftentimes, the girlfriend in the community (perceived or real) is the wife’s
eldest unmarried sister, who usually lives in close proximity to the couple.
Other frequent female complaints result from men’s inability to provide sufficient
quantities of meat or work in fields. Instead of working, men also visit kin but allocate
more non-productive time than women to politicking with unrelated individuals and
drinking. Men’s drinking, especially away from the community, is another common
cause of women’s complaints since men often squander wages on store-bought liquor.
Anecdotal reports of wives hiding money from inebriated husbands wishing to buy
alcohol from traveling river merchants are common. The fact that 98% of women
expressed at least one complaint to husbands over being inebriated in the month prior to
interviews indicates the near ubiquitous nature of the conflict, which often leads to
spousal violence (see chapter five).
Another frequent complaint among Tsimane’ wives concerns men’s village
absenteeism due to wage labor. Frustrations stem from a combination of men not
fulfilling subsistence roles, feelings of loneliness and fear at night, and women’s dislike
of in-laws, especially when few consanguineal kin are present. In addition, unlike
subsistence work, women are unable to exert control over men’s wages and are not
always privy to men’s earnings. Wives and children often do not accompany men during
wage labor stints, which can range from a few days to several weeks without returning to
the village. This is not to say that wages are rarely directed toward enhancing familial
welfare. Some women express no complaints over a husband’s spending habits. In fact,
only 14% of women listed men’s involvement in wage labor as a frequent source of
complaints to husbands (without a prompt). This might not be surprising given the
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sporadic nature of wage labor opportunities. However, 88% of women complained in the
year prior to interviews over men’s community absenteeism from market involvement.
Finally, a number of Tsimane’ women express complaints over men’s inability or
unwillingness to purchase contraceptives from San Borja pharmacies. Such grievances
are not expressed on a daily basis but they are nevertheless prevalent: 53% of
reproductive-aged women complained to spouses in the year prior to interviews because a
husband would or had not purchased contraception despite the wife’s pleas otherwise.
Most men agree that having children entails quite a burden and when asked why they
wish to have fewer children than their ancestors, many respond by saying, “carij” or
“cuesta mantener” (it is hard work). Despite these claims, few men comply with
women’s requests to purchase contraceptives. Men’s common objections include lack of
money, ignorance of the appropriate pills or injections to buy (along with a fear of
asking), a desire to have more children, and beliefs that contraceptives either do not work,
harm the woman’s body, and preclude sexual relations with wives.
Despite their numerous complaints, many women refrain from discussing spousal
conflicts with others. Words travel fast in Tsimane’ communities, and attempts by
individuals to intervene on a woman’s behalf can lead to more serious problems with a
disgruntled husband. For example, a 35 year-old female informant once confided in her
mother after receiving a severe beating from her drunken husband for not having food
prepared upon his arrival to the house. Within minutes of revealing the complaint, the
woman’s three adult brothers and father, who happened to be the husband’s drinking
partners and were also severely intoxicated, arrived with shotguns and machetes to
confront the abusive man and demand that he never mistreat his wife again. After
apologizing to his wife and in-laws, the husband threatened to kill his wife later that night
amid a severe beating if she disclosed their affairs to anyone again. For this reason, this
informant refuses to discuss any marital problems to this day.
Compared to spousal disputes, we know much less about conflict between parents
and offspring due, in part, to the difficulties of interviewing children about sensitive
topics. We can, however, offer some anecdotes. Younger weaned children often cry in
response to mothers leaving them with extended family babysitters instead of bringing
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them fishing or to the garden to play or work. Resistance to performing delegated tasks
also represents a frequent arena of conflict throughout childhood (see chapter three), often
causing mothers to castigate or physically punish disobedient children. Rather than
complying with parental demands, children generally prefer playing, socializing,
completing school assignments, or resting/eating. Parenting styles vary tremendously as
well. Whereas some parents claim that physical punishment weakens the child, others do
not refrain from providing corporal punishment with hands, sticks, or other available
objects.
Entry into adolescence signifies changes in the child’s relations with parents.
Although levels of household production are increasing, older children also begin
spending time searching for potential mates. For boys, this often occurs outside of the
community and is combined with wage labor opportunities near other Tsimane’ villages.
Older girls, in contrast, generally increase visibility by visiting other households and
spending time in the village center where others gather for soccer games, parties, church
services, or other community events. Several husbands expressed frustrations with wives
for failing to properly monitor the activities of older daughters. Parent-offspring conflict
over girls marrying too soon and withdrawing assistance from natal households to begin a
family is not uncommon. Fathers may express resentment towards an undesired son-inlaw by saying that he does not know how to hunt or work a field. Although less frequent,
quarrels between parents and older sons occur over the diversion of work effort from the
natal household and toward prospective mates and affinal kin instead.
Significance to the Research Design
On the one hand, anthropologists study subsistence-level societies because their
physical and social environments share numerous features with those lifeways
characteristic of the majority of human evolutionary history. Such features include kinbased residential groupings with limited privacy and an economy characterized by
foraging with little inheritable wealth. On the other hand, contemporary foragers are not
isolated and have interacted with “non-traditional” peoples for centuries. These relations
continue to foster increasing levels of integration into broader market economies and may
consist of trading networks, sporadic wage labor, or exposure to international
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development programs. The study of contemporary foragers can therefore offer insights
into both the selective pressures that have shaped human psychology, along with the
effects of changes in household production, and the control of wealth on family
dynamics.
Tsimane’ economy and sociality provides opportunities to explore cooperative
and conflictive kin relationships in novel ways. Children have the ability to assist
families from an early age. Because of the abundance of available productive activities,
children often engage in tasks that satisfy personal needs generating fewer kin-directed
benefits. This provides an opportunity to examine parent-offspring conflict over
household labor allocation. Natural fertility populations are well suited for such studies,
as the great variation in family composition and children’s economic roles through time
provides statistical power to the tests. In addition, the lack of taboo topics of
conversation often found in Western societies, combined with the astounding honesty of
participants, tremendously facilitates the collection of sensitive information about spousal
conflict and violence.
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CHAPTER 3: PARENT-OFFSPRING CONFLICT AND TASK DELEGATION

Introduction
Intrafamilial division of labor is common in all societies, suggesting it plays an
essential role in kinship organization (Murdock and Provost, 1973) and human life
history (Bird, 1999; Gurven et al. 2009). The nature of familial labor allocation therefore
has implications for many theoretical issues spanning the subfields of anthropology as
well as other disciplines. In this paper we employ the theory of parent-offspring conflict
(Trivers, 1974) to investigate household labor allocation. Parent-offspring conflict theory
generates the hypothesis that a parent will manipulate the child’s time in a manner that
maximizes parental fitness, even if the action is harmful to the particular child. This
implies that tasks that have fewer positive effects on parental fitness are more likely to
result in conflicts of interest between parent and child. The theory therefore provides a
constructive framework for predicting the types of tasks that are more likely to be 1)
delegated to children, and 2) resisted by children following delegation. We also consider
how family labor demand and task exertion influence parent-offspring conflict by
examining changes in the costs and benefits associated with kin-directed altruism.

Hamilton’s rule and parent-offspring conflict theory
Selection favors altruism when the fitness benefit (B) to the recipient of the act
devalued by the genetic relatedness (r) between the recipient and donor of the act is
greater than the fitness cost (C) to the actor (Br>C) (Hamilton, 1964). Kin selection
theory implies that parents and children will differ in the degree of optimal levels of kindirected altruism (Trivers, 1974). From a biological parent’s perspective, each child is
genetically related to them by the degree 0.5. But among a sibship of children, each child
is related to a full sibling by 0.5 but to themselves by 1.0. From the child’s perspective,
selection will favor kin-directed altruism when the benefits exceed twice the costs.
Parents, however, are selected to promote kin-directed altruism as long as the benefits
exceed the costs. Conflict is expected when the parent will benefit from the child’s
altruistic act at a net cost to the child (C<B<2C). Under these circumstances parents are
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expected to “train” the child to act more altruistically than the child would act of its own
accord through the delegation of labor, and the child is sometimes selected to resist such
attempts at manipulation.
Several factors can influence the costs and benefits of household production and
thus influence levels of parent-offspring conflict. The degree of physical exertion
associated with task performance will increase direct costs to the child. Given relatedness
asymmetries, the cost that the parent is willing to exert on the child providing an inclusive
fitness benefit is expected to exceed the cost of altruism that the child is willing to bear.
However, as bodies grow and the physical costs of task performance decrease, levels of
parent-offspring conflict will also diminish. The benefits to the child of on-the-job
training will also increase as children grow and can learn more effectively through task
performance (Bock 2002b). In addition, as the child begins to make more decisions
independently with age, he/she acquires a sense of the proper timing of when and how to
appropriately participate in household production and time allocation to work increases
without parental direction. This is especially relevant for tasks that the child performs
routinely and when responsibilities are well defined. Parental guidance might be
necessary regarding chores that the child is not accustomed to performing customarily
due, for example, to effects of seasonality on resource availability.
Increasing family labor demand is expected to increase the benefits of kin-directed
altruism to parent and child. The value of the child’s labor will increase as the number of
recipient (typically younger) siblings grows or parental absence creates a need for the
child to serve as a substitute worker. Given relatedness asymmetries, with increasing
family labor demands selection will favor a greater willingness on behalf of the parent to
manipulate the child’s time since the parent is equally related to all children. However, as
the physical costs of task performance decrease with age and the benefits of the child’s
labor increase, interests of the parent and child will increasingly converge.
Parent-offspring conflict theory suggests that conflict will result, in part, over
appropriate levels of the child’s overall production. Indeed, recent studies suggest that
disputes result from differences in perspective between child and parent over the costbenefit structure of children’s time allocation to productive and non-productive activities
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such as schooling (Bock, 2002a). A child might want to spend more time acquiring skills
necessary for future productivity, whereas a parent might need the child’s labor
immediately to support other offspring. Using similar logic, disputes might also result
from differences in perspective between child and parent regarding the optimal level of
production that primarily benefits the child and fails to significantly benefit kin. This
implies that conflict will occur not simply over whether or not children work but also
over the type of work performed.
To date, applications of economic models of intergenerational labor allocation in
the nuclear family (Becker, 1991; Chayanov, 1966 [1925]) to traditional human
subsistence patterns do not consider conflicts of interest resulting from sexual
reproduction. Households are viewed as single decision-making entities composed of
individuals who agree on how to optimally combine their time and production. This
approach, often referred to as the common preference or benevolent dictator model,
entails that kin are equally motivated to achieve an efficient division of labor based on
their different strength- and skill-dependent abilities (Gurven and Kaplan, 2006; Lee and
Kramer, 2002). It is restrictive in the sense that it assumes all resources are shared and
that threats of punishing selfish behavior by an altruistic household head are sufficient to
induce altruism among selfish individuals (Becker’s “Rotten Kid theorem”). However, in
addition to critiques of both the Rotten Kid theorem and the common preference model
(e.g., Bergstrom 1989, 1996), parent-offspring conflict theory stresses that interests of
parents and offspring converge only with respect to maximizing parental fitness. An act
enhancing the child’s fitness might not have the same effect on the parent, who is
concerned with maximizing fitness of all children. This implies that the child’s work
effort is strategic in the sense that activities primarily benefiting ego are prioritized over
activities primarily benefiting the family. Therefore, parents have an incentive to
manipulate children’s productive behavior.
Despite challenges to the theory of parent-offspring conflict (Altmann, 1980;
Barrett and Henzi, 2000; Bateson, 1994; Godfray, 1995; Mock and Forbes, 1992), its
predictions have been supported theoretically (Parker and Macnair, 1978) and empirically
across a variety of species and contexts (Agarwal et al., 2001; Hager and Johnstone,
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2003; Haig, 1993; Pugesek, 1990). Anthropological research into parent-offspring
conflict has focused primarily on weaning (Fouts et al., 2005; Maestripieri, 2002;
McDade, 2001) due, in part, to widespread reports of infant distress during this transition
and because maternal-infant interactions are easily observed. Few studies, however, have
explored parent-offspring conflict following weaning despite Trivers’s suggestion that
conflict is likely to be salient beyond this point in species where PI is crucial to offspring
survival and reproduction. The unique human life history pattern of extended childhood
and simultaneous PI in multiple offspring of different ages (Gurven and Walker, 2006;
Lancaster and Lancaster, 1983) presents a novel avenue to examine parent-offspring
conflict following weaning.
Our paper begins to address how changes in the cost-benefit structure of task
performance influence levels of parent-offspring conflict. We examine household task
delegation because it unambiguously involves an attempt on behalf of the parent to alter
the child’s activities. We also examine children’s resistance toward performing assigned
tasks. Refusal to comply immediately following delegation signifies a desire to engage in
a preferred alternative activity despite parental requests otherwise.

Previous studies of task delegation
Anthropologists have long been interested in the effects of task delegation on
children’s socialization. There is general agreement that task delegation is a means by
which parents facilitate on-the-job training for activities critical to sex-specific adult
roles. Studies of compliance pressures emphasize that greater parental demands are
imposed on children with age for both sexes (Erchak, 1980), and that girls are delegated
more responsibilities than boys, especially with respect to domestic work and parenting
younger siblings (Barry et al., 1957; Draper, 1975; Draper and Cashdan, 1988; Weisner et
al., 1977; Whiting and Edwards, 1973). Boys, on the other hand, receive more pressure
to be self-reliant and are afforded more time to play and wander without adult
supervision. Sex differences in task assignment might influence children’s future
willingness to engage in kin-directed altruism (Ember, 1973; Munroe et al., 1984;
Whiting and Whiting, 1971).
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Other studies highlight ecological factors affecting variation in the frequency of
task delegation. Positive correlations are reported between compliance pressures on
children and adult (particularly maternal) subsistence involvement within and across
cultures (Barry et al., 1959; Brown, 1973; Draper and Cashdan, 1988; Munroe and
Munroe, 1977; Whiting and Whiting, 1975). Parent-offspring labor substitution is
particularly helpful to alleviate the burden of raising multiple dependents on parents,
since offspring altriciality renders high-quality, direct childcare incompatible with many
subsistence activities (Bove et al., 2002; Hames, 1988; Hurtado et al., 1992; Kramer,
2005; Turke, 1988).
In accordance with the common preference model, the above-referenced studies
generally view work force integration as beneficial to parent and child. Children’s shortterm production contributes to familial welfare and might simultaneously increase future
productivity through skill acquisition during task performance. But because of the
paucity of research into decision-making processes underlying household labor, it remains
unclear which productive tasks children are more likely to engage in independently,
which tasks are more likely to be delegated, and which tasks are more likely to be met
with resistance following delegation.

Hypothesis and predictions regarding parent-offspring conflict over labor
Age is hypothesized to have a negative effect on the probability of delegation and
resistance due to increasing returns of on-the-job training and a decrease in the physical
cost of task performance as children grow. A main effect of both father’s village
absenteeism and number of younger siblings is hypothesized to increase the probability of
delegation and resistance due to the greater willingness on behalf of the parent to
manipulate the child’s time as labor demand increases given relatedness asymmetries. An
interaction between number of younger siblings and age is predicted to lower the
probability of delegation and resistance due to the decreasing physical cost of task
performance and greater inclusive fitness benefits. Degree of physical exertion associated
with task performance is hypothesized to increase the probability of delegation and
resistance. Finally, reduced conflict over labor allocation is expected as paternal absence
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increases the value of the child’s labor, particularly with respect to strength-intensive,
family-directed tasks.
Asymmetries in relatedness between parents and offspring suggest that the
optimal mixture of time to production primarily benefiting the child and the family will
differ for parents and children. All else equal, a child is expected to bias work effort
toward productive activities yielding benefits to ego. While benefits may be material
(e.g., calories) or non-material (e.g., knowledge of animal behavior), a crucial feature of
such productive tasks is that kin-directed benefits are byproducts. Consider the contrast
between collecting fruit and clearing a field. Fruit collection satisfies caloric needs for
the child and is unlikely to result in significant provisioning of kin since fruits are often
consumed on site and contribute no more than about 5% of energy in the modern forager
diet (Kaplan et al., 2000). Field clearance, in contrast, results in few immediate benefits
to the child, and the calories obtained from a harvest are more equitably distributed
among kin over time. Therefore, field clearance is likely to have a greater positive effect
on parental fitness than fruit collection.
More generally, this reasoning leads to the hypothesis that parent-offspring
conflict is more likely to occur over productive tasks that have fewer positive effects on
parental fitness; that is, when the child is the primary beneficiary and can reap most or all
benefits from task performance. This hypothesis generates the following predictions:
tasks primarily benefiting the child are less likely to be delegated because children are
more likely to perform them of their own accord; tasks primarily benefiting the family are
more likely to be delegated because children are less likely to perform them of their own
accord; once delegated, tasks primarily benefiting the child are less likely to be met with
resistance; and once delegated, tasks primarily benefiting the family are more likely to be
met with resistance.

Methods
The study population
The Tsimane’ are forager-farmers inhabiting the rainforests and savannas in the
Beni department of central lowland Bolivia. Published census estimates range from
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6,351 (INE, 2003) to 7,130 (VAIPO, 1998). The majority of villages are located along
the Maniqui River, but many communities are situated in the interior forest, near market
towns, or adjacent to other rivers. For this study data were collected sporadically from
2006 to 2008 in four communities: Cedral, Chacal, Puerto Triumfo, and Misiόn Fatima.
The first three villages are located in the lower Maniqui region within the Beni Biosphere
Reserve, a protected area of roughly 1,350 km² home to many Tsimane’ and other
Bolivians. The fourth village, which is located in the upper Maniqui region and houses a
Catholic Redemptorist mission, has a population approximating that of the three
Biosphere communities combined (n = 528 individuals, 2008 census).
The Tsimane’ economy is similar to that of other lowland South American
horticulturalists and consists of swidden horticulture, fishing, hunting, and collecting
forest items. From an early age children engage in family-oriented production (e.g.,
garden labor, household chores, care of younger siblings). Because of the abundance of
available productive activities, children often engage in tasks that satisfy personal caloric
or other needs with fewer kin-directed benefits. Some examples include roasting
plantains for individual consumption, fishing or manufacturing fishing items (e.g., hook
and line), and washing or sewing one’s clothing. On occasion, children accompany
fathers while hunting, which results in few material benefits but facilitates skill
acquisition.
Tsimane’ women are the principal task assigners, accounting for 77% of all
delegated chores in our sample. Fathers, in contrast, delegated only 8% of tasks. This
discrepancy is largely due to the fact that women spend more time parenting and in camp
than men (Winking et al., In press) and therefore have more opportunities to delegate
work. Other noteworthy task delegators by kinship category included grandparents and
older sisters, each accounting for 5% of all assigned chores.

Task delegation interview
Interviews were conducted in all but one month of the year to obtain a
representative sample of household economic decision-making across wet and dry
seasons. Interviews included a list of 54 tasks that Tsimane’ children perform regularly
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based on observations and analyses of time allocation data. Participants (usually mothers)
were asked whether the focal co-resident child performed each of the 54 tasks during the
previous day, along with the number of times the task was completed. Once a list of the
previous day’s chores was obtained, we asked whether the child was asked to perform
each task (jutete) or whether it was performed of the child’s own accord (cui’si ya
dyijyedye'). If a task was delegated, we asked if the child complied immediately (se'vaqui
cavintum) or refused to do so (jam må'je' se'vaqui). If resistance was evident, we asked
which activity the child engaged in immediately following resistance toward delegated
task performance. A flowchart of the interview is shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. A flowchart of the task delegation interview

Data analysis
The generalized estimating equations (GEE) method was used to model the
probability of task delegation and children’s resistance toward performing delegated
tasks. GEE modeling permits data analysis of correlated, repeated measures on the same
individuals over time. All analyses specify a binary distribution and exchangeable
correlation structure. Dichotomous dependent variables include whether a task was
delegated, and whether the child exhibited resistance toward delegated task performance
(1 = yes, 0 = no).
To address the hypothesis that parent-offspring conflict is more likely to occur
over tasks that have fewer positive effects on parental fitness, we run separate models
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regressing both the probability of delegation and resistance on task type, a categorical
variable where 1 equals the specific task (hunt, fish, etc.) and 0 equals all other tasks.
Controls include sex and age, which is estimated using demographic data (see Gurven et
al., 2007 for methodology). We include an additional control, father’s village
absenteeism, for analyses in which the probability of delegation is the dependent variable
because father absence has been shown to influence children’s time allocation (Bock,
2002; Bock and Johnson, 2004), presumably increasing the likelihood of task delegation.
Father absenteeism is a continuous variable determined by the father’s self-reported
number of days away from the community during the sample year.
Productive activities were categorized based on whether benefits of task
performance are realized more exclusively by the child or are more equitably directed
toward kin (Table 3.1). We recognize that this categorization likely obscures important
characteristics of tasks in which both the child and family benefit. Hunting or fishing, for
example, can simultaneously result in skill acquisition for the child and kin provisioning.
We would expect less parent-offspring conflict over productive tasks in which the
primary beneficiary is ambiguous. But for the purposes of evaluating parent-offspring
conflict theory, we assume that the child primarily benefits from tasks in which the main
beneficiary is ambiguous since kin-directed altruism is not a necessary component of task
performance.
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Table 3.1. Task categorization by primary beneficiary of performance
Primary beneficiary
Child

Food process
Food acquisition

Other chores

Family

Food process
Food acquisition
Other chores

Sibcare

Task type
Roast plantains/tend fire
Forage
Fish
Hunt
Sew
Manufacture foraging items
Wash clothes
Process rice
Make chicha (homemade beer)
Garden
Clean house
Get wood/water
Animal care
Wash plates
Construct house
All forms

Results are presented as log odds (B) of an outcome or as odds ratios (OR). An
OR greater than 1 indicates than an outcome is more likely with each higher level of the
predictor, and an OR less than 1 indicates that an outcome is less likely with each higher
level of the predictor.
Results
The sample consisted of 177 children aged 4 to 18 from 66 families. The mean
number of completed tasks and days sampled per child was 44.6 (SD = 27.04) and 3.82
(SD = 0.9), respectively.

Task delegation
The probability of a task being delegated decreases with age (B = -0.058, p<0.001;
see Figure 3.2). While the sex difference observed in early childhood is not significant,
girls aged 16+ are more likely to be delegated a task than similarly-aged boys (χ² = 3.91,
df = 1, p = 0.048), possibly indicating heightened conflict between parents and nubile
daughters over the timing of family formation. A detailed breakdown of the frequency of
task delegation by activity category and age is displayed in Tables 3.2 (boys) and 3.3
(girls).
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Figure 3.2. Task delegation frequency by age and sex
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Table 3.2. Task delegation frequency by activity category and age: Boys

Primary
beneficiary
Child

Task type
Food
process
Food
acquisition

Roast
plantains
Forage
Fish
Hunt

Other
chores

Sew
Manufacture
foraging items
Wash clothes

Family

Food
process

Process rice
Make chicha

Food
acquisition
Other
chores

Garden
Clean house
Get
wood/water
Animal care
Wash plates

Sibcare

Construct
house
All forms

Number of tasks completed
(Proportion delegated)
Ages 4 to 8
Ages 9 to
Ages 14+
(n=39)
13 (n=34)
(n=20)
332
305
135
(0.12)
(0.1)
(0.04)
34
41
3
(0.18)
(0.32)
(0.0)
17
33
26
(0.29)
(0.42)
(0.19)
2
6
7
(1.0)
(0.5)
(0.43)
2
19
8
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
4
9
2
(0.0)
(0.33)
(0.5)
9
32
29
(0.33)
(0.16)
(0.03)
10
27
24
(0.3)
(0.33)
(0.38)
2
1
2
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
62
74
52
(0.53)
(0.76)
(0.6)
11
9
1
(0.36)
(0.78)
(0.0)
175
205
99
(0.76)
(0.81)
(0.48)
92
81
19
(0.43)
(0.49)
(0.37)
89
115
36
(0.46)
(0.37)
(0.19)
5
21
9
(1.0)
(0.33)
(0.67)
506
346
97
(0.59)
(0.49)
(0.29)
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Total
(n=93)
772
(0.1)
78
(0.24)
76
(0.32)
15
(0.53)
29
(0.0)
15
(0.27)
70
(0.13)
61
(0.34)
5
(0.0)
188
(0.64)
21
(0.52)
479
(0.72)
192
(0.45)
240
(0.38)
35
(0.51)
949
(0.52)

Table 3.3. Task delegation frequency by activity category and age: Girls

Primary
beneficiary
Child

Task type
Food
process
Food
acquisition

Roast
plantains
Forage
Fish
Hunt

Other
chores

Sew
Manufacture
foraging items
Wash clothes

Family

Food
process

Process rice
Make chicha

Food
acquisition
Other
chores

Garden
Clean house
Get
wood/water
Animal care
Wash plates

Sibcare

Construct
house
All forms

Number of tasks completed
(Proportion delegated)
Ages 4 to 8
Ages 9 to
Ages 14+
(n=38)
13 (n=30)
(n=16)
355
365
202
(0.15)
(0.29)
(0.19)
35
36
13
(0.2)
(0.14)
(0.0)
10
19
5
(0.4)
(0.47)
(0.2)
0
3
1
(0.0)
(0.67)
(1.0)
10
39
17
(0.1)
(0.0)
(0.18)
2
3
0
(0.5)
(0.33)
(0.0)
19
60
37
(0.37)
(0.22)
(0.11)
15
91
72
(0.47)
(0.31)
(0.24)
6
16
4
(0.33)
(0.56)
(0.75)
29
73
50
(0.38)
(0.56)
(0.52)
15
38
25
(0.6)
(0.66)
(0.28)
219
338
175
(0.71)
(0.6)
(0.37)
93
82
38
(0.29)
(0.32)
(0.45)
134
171
117
(0.61)
(0.54)
(0.41)
6
6
6
(1.0)
(0.5)
(0.83)
651
711
258
(0.52)
(0.37)
(0.27)

Total
(n=84)
922
(0.21)
84
(0.14)
34
(0.41)
4
(0.75)
66
(0.06)
5
(0.4)
116
(0.21)
178
(0.29)
26
(0.54)
152
(0.51)
78
(0.53)
732
(0.58)
213
(0.33)
422
(0.53)
18
(0.78)
1620
(0.41)

Contrasting macro-categories of tasks by primary beneficiary shows that
frequency of delegation is greater for food acquisition and domestic chores in which
benefits are more equitably directed toward kin, regardless of sex (Figures 3.3 and 3.4).
These differences persist with age. Also noteworthy is the fact that the rate of delegation
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for sibcare exceeds that of food acquisition and domestic chores that primarily benefit the
child for both sexes across age categories.
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Other chores (child)
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Figure 3.3. Task delegation frequency by activity category and age: Boys
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Figure 3.4. Task delegation frequency by activity category and age: Girls

The probability of a task being delegated declines with age controlling for other
factors (Table 3.4), indicating the increasing returns to independent task performance due
to greater body size. As hypothesized, the two proxies of family labor demand, number
of co-resident younger siblings (controlling for number of older siblings) and father’s
village absenteeism, positively predict the probability of task delegation. This suggests
greater parent-offspring conflict since the parent must exert greater structure on the
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child’s time even as inclusive fitness benefits to the child increase. As children age,
however, an increase in the number of younger siblings significantly lowers the
probability of delegation, indicating a decrease in parent-offspring conflict as fitness
interests converge and the child experiences fewer costs and greater benefits from task
performance. Finally, tasks that require higher levels of physical exertion are
significantly more likely to be delegated, suggesting that parents are willing to inflict
greater physical costs than the child is willing to bear in order to facilitate kin-directed
altruism.

Table 3.4. General estimating equations (GEE) analysis of effect of age, family labor
demand, and degree of task exertion on the probability of delegation (n = 7,895 tasks,
177 children, 3,173 delegated tasks)
Parameter
Intercept
Age
Sex = male
Number of co-resident younger siblings
Number of co-resident older siblings
Father’s village absenteeism
Physical exertion = high
Number of co-resident younger siblings*Age

B
-0.374
-0.049
0.029
0.332
-0.177
0.021
1.121
-0.032

SE
0.32
0.029
0.118
0.113
0.046
0.004
0.096
0.009

p
Wald χ2
1.36
0.244
2.942 0.086
0.062 0.804
8.7 0.003
14.656 <0.001
29.837 <0.001
135.985 <0.001
11.614
0.001

The summary of GEE analyses modeling the probability of delegation as a
function of task type is presented in Table 3.5. Support for the prediction that tasks
primarily benefiting the child are less likely to be delegated entail odds ratios less than 1.
Of the eight independent tests, five are significant and in the predicted direction.
Contrary to prediction, hunting is more likely to be delegated than other tasks controlling
for age, sex, and father absenteeism, but the effect is marginally significant. This
suggests that parents delegate tasks seldom performed as a way to encourage skill
development and is consistent with Tsimane’ mothers’ expressed desires to create
apprenticeship opportunities for adolescent boys to learn hunting techniques from fathers.
To lower the probability of making a type I error, we use a modified Bonferroni
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adjustment and find that all five tests in the predicted direction retain their significance.
None of the tests are significant and in the opposite direction after modifying alpha levels.
Support for the prediction that tasks primarily benefiting the family are more
likely to be delegated entail odds ratios greater than 1. Of the nine independent tests, six
are significant and in the predicted direction. Both tests that run counter to prediction are
not significant. After using a modified Bonferroni adjustment, three of the six tests in the
predicted direction retain their significance.

Table 3.5. Summary of GEE analyses of effect of task type on the probability of
delegation. Controls for each model include age, sex, and, father’s village absenteeism
(n = 7,895 tasks, 177 children, 3,173 delegated tasks)
Primary
beneficiary
Child

N completed
(N delegated)
1694 (271)

Task type
Food process
Food
acquisition

Roast plantains1

Probability of delegation
Odds
p
Direction
ratio
0.205 Predicted
<0.001†

Forage
162 (31)
0.391 Predicted
<0.001†
Fish
110 (38)
0.868 Predicted
0.557
Hunt
19 (11)
2.109
Opposite
0.077
Other chores Sew
95 (4)
0.062 Predicted
0.001†
Manufacture foraging
20 (6)
0.357 Predicted
0.202
items
Wash clothes
186 (33)
0.373 Predicted
<0.001†
All tasks where main beneficiary=child
2286 (394)
0.202 Predicted
<0.001†
Food process Process rice
239 (73)
0.823
Opposite
0.266
Family
Make chicha
31 (14)
1.318 Predicted
0.478
Food
acquisition
Garden
340 (198)
2.366 Predicted
<0.001†
Other chores Clean house
99 (52)
1.697 Predicted
0.023
Get wood/water
1211 (771)
3.32
Predicted
<0.001†
Animal care
405 (157)
0.958
Opposite
0.76
Wash plates
662 (314)
1.426 Predicted
0.001†
Construct house
53 (32)
2.073 Predicted
0.06
Sibcare
All forms
2569 (1168)
1.282 Predicted
0.009
1
Valid parameter estimates and standard errors could not be computed with inclusion of a sex term so it was
omitted.
†
Significance retained following modified Bonferroni adjustment

Controlling for age, family labor demand, and degree of task exertion, the
probability of delegation strongly decreases if the child is the primary beneficiary of task
performance (Table 3.6). As paternal absence increases, the probability of being
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delegated a strength-intensive task decreases suggesting reduced conflict over labor
allocation since children independently respond to household need when the value of
labor increases. This response would be particularly beneficial if children biased labor
toward family directed tasks. Indeed, we find that as paternal absence increases, the
probability of being delegated a horticultural task is marginally lower than the baseline of
ego-directed food acquisition tasks (Table 3.7). Furthermore, relative to ego-directed
food processing tasks we find that the probability of being delegated family-directed food
processing tasks is marginally lower as paternal absence increases (Table 3.8).

Table 3.6. GEE analysis of effect of age, family labor demand, degree of task exertion,
and primary beneficiary of task performance on the probability of delegation (n = 7,895
tasks, 177 children, 3,173 delegated tasks)
p
Parameter
B
SE
Wald χ2
Intercept
-0.32 0.381
0.705 0.401
Age
-0.03 0.035
0.734 0.392
Number of co-resident younger siblings
0.411 0.171
5.814 0.016
Number of co-resident older siblings
-0.098 0.056
3.102 0.078
Father’s village absenteeism
0.023 0.005
22.38 <0.001
Primary beneficiary = child
-1.441 0.122 139.163 <0.001
Physical exertion = high
1.093 0.165
43.877 <0.001
Number of co-resident younger siblings*Age
-0.041 0.015
7.635 0.006
Physical exertion = high* Father’s village
3.972 0.046
-0.012 0.006
absenteeism
Table 3.7. GEE analysis of effect of father absenteeism on the probability of being
delegated a horticultural task (n = 631 food acquisition tasks, 152 children, 278
delegated tasks)
p
Parameter
B
SE
Wald χ2
Intercept
-2.125 0.506
17.667 <0.001
Age
0.03 0.034
0.795 0.373
Sex = male
0.408 0.234
3.044 0.081
Father’s village absenteeism
0.033 0.014
5.208 0.022
Food acquisition task = horticulture
1.794 0.405
19.603 <0.001
Food acquisition task = horticulture* Father’s
2.986 0.084
-0.029 0.017
village absenteeism
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Table 3.8. GEE analysis of effect of father absenteeism on the probability of being
delegated a family food processing task (n = 1,964 food processing tasks, 176 children,
358 delegated tasks)
p
Parameter
B
SE
Wald χ2
Intercept
-1.813 0.405
20.081 <0.001
Age
0.009 0.029
0.087 0.768
Sex = male
-0.633 0.225
7.904 0.005
Father’s village absenteeism
0.011 0.009
1.405 0.236
Food processing task = family
1.947 0.423
21.208 <0.001
Food processing task = family* Father’s village
2.992 0.084
-0.026 0.015
absenteeism
Resistance toward performing delegated tasks
The probability of resistance toward performing delegated tasks decreases with
age, although the effect is not significant (B = -0.031, p = 0.128; see Figure 3.5). This is
due to the almost linear increase in girls’ resistance frequency until mid-adolescence.
Controlling for age and age squared, boys are more likely to resist performing delegated
tasks than girls (OR = 1.41, p = 0.029, sex = male). Inclusion of a sex by age interaction
term indicates that the increase in age has a marginally greater negative effect on the
likelihood of resistance for boys than girls (B = -0.075, p = 0.064, sex=male*age). These
results suggest that differences in rates of maturation and the timing of energy allocation
to reproduction should be considered in assessing the physical costs of task performance
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Figure 3.5. Frequency of resistance toward performing delegated tasks by age and sex
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Play represents children’s major preferred alternative to performing delegated
work in early childhood, prompting nearly 90% of resistance events for children aged 4 to
6 (Figures 3.6 and 3.7). A shift from prioritizing play to socialization at the expense of
immediate delegated task performance is increasingly evident with age for both sexes.
For adolescent girls, idle activities including resting and eating are equally or more
important than socializing, which possibly points to the importance of fat deposition prior
to girls’ entry into the marriage market. This preference coincides with the peak in
resistance rate for girls.
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Figure 3.6. Preferred alternatives to performing delegated work by age: Boys

100%

% of resistance events

90%
80%
70%

Other

60%

Rest/eat

50%

Social

40%

Homework
Play

30%
20%
10%
0%
4 to 6

7 to 9

10 to 12

13 to 15

16+

Age

Figure 3.7. Preferred alternatives to performing delegated work by age: Girls
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Contrasting macro-categories of delegated tasks by primary beneficiary shows that
frequency of resistance is greater for food acquisition tasks in which benefits are more
equitably distributed among kin, regardless of sex (Figures 3.8 and 3.9). For domestic
tasks, the pattern is less clear and might reflect the small sample of delegated chores
primarily benefiting the child, particularly for boys aged 9 – 13 and 14 – 18 (n = 37 and 7
delegated tasks, respectively).
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Figure 3.8. Frequency of resistance by activity category and age: Boys
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Figure 3.9. Frequency of resistance by activity category and age: Girls
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The effects of family labor demand proxies on the probability of resistance are
somewhat inconsistent (Table 3.9). As hypothesized, number of co-resident younger
siblings positively predicts the probability of resistance, suggesting heightened parentoffspring conflict over optimal levels of familial investment when more kin can benefit
from the child’s labor. However, the effect of father’s village absenteeism is in the
opposite direction as predicted but not significant. Given the above finding that paternal
absence increases the likelihood of family-directed labor substitution without delegation,
we might not expect an increase in conflict if the labor shortage places a premium on
increased efficiency of all household members. As children age, an increase in the
number of younger siblings marginally lowers the probability of resistance, again
indicating decreasing levels of conflict as physical costs decline, benefits accrue from onthe-job training, and the inclusive fitness benefits increase. Finally, tasks that require
higher levels of physical exertion are more likely to be resisted. This indicates that
children indeed respond to increasing costs by attempting to defer involvement in
physically demanding labor, and provides further evidence that parental desires to
maximize household efficiency are not always congruent with the child’s self interests
(and vice versa).

Table 3.9. GEE analysis of effect of age, family labor demand, and degree of task
exertion on the probability of resistance following delegation (n = 3,173 delegated tasks,
169 children, 1,010 resistance events)
Parameter
Intercept
Age
Sex = male
Number of co-resident younger siblings
Number of co-resident older siblings
Father’s village absenteeism
Physical exertion = high
Number of co-resident younger siblings*Age

B
-0.632
-0.044
0.322
0.36
-0.136
-0.007
0.327
-0.022

SE
0.377
0.038
0.158
0.15
0.065
0.006
0.123
0.013

Wald χ2
2.807
1.337
4.152
5.759
4.338
1.341
7.052
3.125

p
0.094
0.247
0.042
0.016
0.037
0.247
0.008
0.077

The summary of GEE analyses modeling the probability of resistance toward
performing delegated work as a function of task type is presented in Table 3.10. Support
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for the prediction that delegated tasks primarily benefiting the child are less likely to be
met with resistance entail odds ratios less than 1. Of the seven independent tests for
which valid standard errors can be computed, three are in the predicted direction and
either significant or marginally significant. Contrary to prediction, washing clothes is
more likely to be resisted than other delegated tasks controlling for age and sex, but the
effect is not significant. None of the tests in the predicted direction retain significance
after using a modified Bonferroni adjustment.
Support for the prediction that delegated tasks primarily benefiting the family are
more likely to be met with resistance entail odds ratios greater than 1. Of the nine
independent tests, three are in the predicted direction and either significant or marginally
significant. With the exception of domestic animal care, all tests that run counter to
prediction are not significant. Once again, none of the tests in the predicted (or opposing)
direction retain significance after using a modified Bonferroni adjustment. The predicted
effect of primary beneficiary on the probability of resistance remains marginally
significant after controlling for age, sex, sibship composition, and degree of task exertion
(Table 3.11).
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Table 3.10. Summary of GEE analyses of effect of task type on the probability of
resistance following delegation. Controls for each model include age and sex (n = 3,173
delegated tasks, 169 children, 1,010 resistance events)

Primary
beneficiary
Child

Task type
Food process
Food
acquisition

N resisted

Roast plantains

74

Probability of resistance
Odds
p
Direction
ratio
0.677 Predicted
0.162

Forage
4
0.327 Predicted
Fish
7
0.347 Predicted
Hunt
1
0.201 Predicted
1
0
--Other chores Sew
Manufacture foraging
2
1.044 Equivocal
items
Wash clothes
15
1.631
Opposite
All tasks where main beneficiary=child
103
0.628 Predicted
Food process Process rice
22
1.089 Predicted
Family
Make chicha
1
0.191
Opposite
Food
acquisition
Garden
72
1.373 Predicted
Other chores Clean house
25
2.075 Predicted
Get wood/water
270
1.419 Predicted
Animal care
38
0.647
Opposite
Wash plates
92
0.886
Opposite
Construct house
7
0.635
Opposite
Sibcare
All forms
380
0.937
Opposite
1
Valid parameter estimates and standard errors could not be computed due to the low observed
frequency of resistance following delegation.

Table 3.11. GEE analysis of effect of primary beneficiary of task performance on the
probability of resistance following delegation (n = 3,173 delegated tasks, 169 children,
1,010 resistance events)
Parameter

B
-0.238
-0.086
0.34
0.089
-0.148
-0.413
0.288

Intercept
Age
Sex = male
Number of co-resident younger siblings
Number of co-resident older siblings
Primary beneficiary = child
Physical exertion = high

42

SE
0.307
0.029
0.164
0.055
0.066
0.222
0.122

Wald χ2
0.6
9.052
4.314
2.603
5.085
3.464
5.584

p
0.439
0.003
0.038
0.107
0.024
0.063
0.018

0.02
0.087
0.157
-0.958
0.111
0.036
0.77
0.154
0.082
0.019
0.006
0.056
0.504
0.212
0.593

Discussion
We offer a novel approach to evaluating Trivers’s (1974) theory of parentoffspring conflict by examining task delegation and resistance toward performing
assigned tasks. Consistent with the theory, our results suggest that parents are selected to
manipulate the child’s behavior in ways that maximize parental fitness, even at a cost to
the child. Tsimane’ children are less likely to be delegated tasks primarily benefiting ego,
and more likely to be delegated tasks primarily benefiting the family. Once delegated, we
find some evidence that tasks primarily benefiting ego are less likely to be met with
resistance, whereas tasks primarily benefiting the family are more likely to be met with
resistance. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that parent-offspring conflict
is more likely to occur over productive activities which have lower positive effects on
parental fitness; namely, when the child is the primary beneficiary of task performance
and fewer kin benefit from such labor.
Our findings are also consistent with reported attitudinal differences between
performing “self-care” (e.g., making one’s bed) and “family-care” (e.g., setting the table)
tasks in industrialized settings. Compared to self-care tasks, children report a greater
willingness to both assign family-care tasks to others and to request payment for
performing family-care tasks (Warton and Goodnow, 1991). This suggests not only
sibling conflict over the allocation of family-care tasks, but also that resistance toward
performing family-care tasks is more likely to occur without direct compensation.
Consideration of the interaction between the varying costs and benefits of altruism
allows for investigation into the dynamic nature of parent-child relations. The extent of
parent-offspring conflict is constrained by a complex interaction between the child’s
increasing size and ability with age and the inclusive fitness benefits resulting from
greater labor demand and converging interests with respect to increasing household
efficiency.
By viewing task delegation as a manifestation of parent-offspring conflict, our
approach differs from that of many anthropologists investigating children’s socialization.
We agree that delegated task performance can be beneficial for the child by fostering
discipline, responsibility, a cooperative attitude, and adult competence through on-the-job
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training (e.g., Whiting and Whiting 1975). However, a primary interest here is to
investigate types of labor that are more likely to result in conflict stemming from
differences in perspective between child and parent over the optimal mixture of
production directed mainly toward ego and kin. These differences can trigger attempts by
parents to alter children’s behaviors in ways that might be sub-optimal from the child’s
perspective. We have attempted to show that task delegation represents one such attempt
at behavioral manipulation precluding children from satisfying self-interests. Parentoffspring conflict theory can account for weak or inconsistent sex differences in
delegation frequency for tasks exhibiting a strong sexual division of labor. For example,
Tsimane’ boys are delegated more sibcare tasks than girls from ages 4 to 8 (χ² = 6.33, df
= 1, p = 0.012) and 9 to 13 (χ² = 13.87, df = 1, p<0.001) despite the fact that Tsimane’
fathers provide much less direct care than mothers (Winking et al., In press). The
hypothesis that task delegation is preparatory for adult competence cannot account for
this result.
Self-directed production is one way that children can accommodate self-interests.
Another way is to engage in non-productive activities that are presumably safer and
impart more skills that will increase future productivity than would time spent in
production due to small body size. Play, for example, enhances sensorimotor and
cognitive abilities among youngsters in many species (Bekoff and Byers, 1998; Pellegrini
and Bjorklund, 2004; Smith, 1982), and prepares children for adult subsistence roles
(Bock and Johnson 2004). The importance of non-productive activities in development
has implications for understanding parent-offspring conflict over labor allocation. Forms
of labor that are more compatible with involvement in non-productive activities may
result in less conflict, even if the family is the primary beneficiary. Tasks of short
duration, close proximity to playmates, and/or requiring relatively low levels of
concentration for competent performance might not substantially interfere with
involvement in preferred non-productive alternatives including play and socializing
(Figures 3.6 and 3.7). This might help explain why the direction of estimates of the
probability of resistance toward performing delegated tasks runs counter to prediction for
several family-oriented tasks such as making chicha, animal care, washing plates, and
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sibcare (see lower half of Table 3.10). Consistent with this view, these family-oriented
tasks are less likely to be delegated (OR = 0.54, p<0.001, controlling for age, sex, and
father’s village absenteeism) and resisted than other family-oriented tasks following
delegation (OR = 0.66, p = 0.001, controlling for age and sex).
Finally, this study poses a direct challenge to the common preference model,
which suggests that individuals allocate work effort without consideration of the primary
beneficiary of task performance. Focusing on the household rather than the individual as
the unit of analysis severely limits our understanding of family dynamics with respect to
resource distribution and the intergenerational division of labor. The importance of
incorporating individual interests into existing models of family economic decisionmaking is becoming increasingly clear not only among social scientists but also in the
international development community (Alderman et al., 1995). An understanding of the
conditions under which conflict occurs over labor allocation from an evolutionary
perspective can inform public policy initiatives directed at improving the well-being of
every household member through attempts to minimize conflict. Encouraging children to
perform household tasks that simultaneously facilitate relevant skill acquisition, for
example, is one potential way to achieve this.
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CHAPTER 4: LABOR DEMAND, CHILDREN’S TIME USE, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR FAMILY CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

Introduction
A growing body of research suggests that household labor demand influences
children’s time use and has implications for understanding collaborative and conflictive
kin dynamics. While evolutionary theory recognizes that parents and children will
disagree over optimal levels of children’s kin-directed altruism, current models of
intergenerational time allocation in the family ignore conflicts of interest stemming from
sexual reproduction (Gurven and Kaplan, 2006; Lee and Kramer, 2002). In this paper we
examine how number of co-resident younger siblings – an indicator of household labor
demand – affects children’s time allocation to productive activities primarily benefitting
the child and the family, as well as to non-productive activities. We evaluate the
hypothesis that parents will manipulate the child’s time in a way that maximizes parental
fitness by focusing on behaviors that vary in the extent to which they offset the cost to
parents of rearing offspring. Due to a combination of children’s capacities to assist in
family production, along with overlapping periods of dependence between co-resident
siblings, we propose that a source of family conflict is over the optimal division of a
child’s time between ego- and family-directed pursuits. We consider how behavioral
manipulation of the child’s time might compromise familial and peer relations.

Intrafamilial conflict over children’s time use
Parents and children have different interests with respect to the division of
household resources (Trivers, 1974). Parents are equally related to all children and
therefore selected to balance resource allocations among current and future offspring.
The child, however, is only partially related to siblings yet fully related to itself. Given
these asymmetries in relatedness, intrafamilial conflict is expected over optimal levels of
parental resource allocation and kin-directed altruism exhibited by the child. Indeed,
mounting behavioral and physiological evidence suggests that children attempt to garner
limited parental resources at the expense of siblings (e.g., Fouts et al., 2005; Haig, 2002).
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Yet the extent to which increasing household labor demand influences manipulation of
the child’s time by parents to encourage kin-directed altruism is less clear.
Given the broad range of opportunities to engage in production in societies
practicing subsistence horticulture and agriculture, a child’s labor strongly influences
household resource availability. Children can substitute for parental labor while parents
engage in work that youngsters do not yet have the necessary skills and/or strength to
perform (Bock, 2002a, b). Alternatively, siblings can substitute for one another’s labor,
assuming that they are equally capable of performing a task and that one child’s labor
frees another child to engage in alternative activities (ibid). Intergenerational labor
substitution redistributes the cost to parents of raising multiple dependents of different
ages. Positive empirical associations between presence of co-resident subadult helpers
and child growth (Hadley, 2005; Stinson, 1980) and mother’s completed fertility (Turke,
1988; but see Hames and Draper, 2004) support the notion that children’s production
increases parental fitness (for a review see Kramer, 2005).
A child’s productive time is used to lower parental subsidy required for the focal
child, the child’s co-resident siblings, or some combination of the two. From the parent’s
perspective, this combination should be such that the point where the marginal fitness
increase from an additional unit of time spent in kin-directed production would be less
than the benefit to the parent of spending that time in ego-directed production. From the
child’s perspective, diminishing returns to kin-directed production are reached earlier
because benefits to siblings are devalued due to relatedness asymmetries. A simplifying
assumption here is that ego- and family-directed production are mutually exclusive,
which applies to some productive activities (e.g., cooking for self) more than others (e.g.,
harvesting rice). Despite this oversimplification, the dichotomy is useful for illustrating
that productive activities have differential effects on enhancing parental fitness based on
the primary beneficiary of task performance. These differential effects are expected to
influence variation in the structuring of children’s time as household labor demand
increases and more kin can benefit from family-directed production.
In addition to production, childhood is characterized by considerable time
allocation to “non-productive” or leisure activities, such as play, social visitation, and
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idling (i.e., socializing with and grooming peers, receiving care, inspecting objects,
resting, any other non-work behavior requiring minimal physical exertion). These
activities are presumably safer and impart more skills (social or work-related) that will
increase future productivity than would time spent working due to small body size. Play,
for example, enhances sensorimotor and cognitive abilities among youngsters in many
species (Bekoff and Byers, 1998; Pellegrini and Smith, 1998; Smith, 1982) and prepares
the child for adult subsistence tasks (Bock and Johnson, 2004). Visitation is an
investment in the child’s social capital by contributing to the maintenance of reciprocal
sharing networks. Idle activities facilitate growth through energy conservation and
likewise foster investment in the child’s social capital when combined with direct
interaction or close spatial proximity to peers. Social grooming and co-resting are ways
that nonhuman primates (especially females) form intimate, lasting bonds that can
enhance fitness (Silk et al., 2003).
A fundamental trade-off with respect to the child’s time allocation to nonproductive activities is that it aids in skill/strength acquisition and thus increases future
returns but entails opportunity costs in terms of foregone production (Bird and Bliege
Bird, 2002; Bock, 2002a, b; Kaplan, 1996). This trade-off is faced not only by the child
but also by parents seeking to maximize returns on investment through the management
of each co-resident child’s time allocation. Recent work suggests that conflict might
result from differences in perspective between child and parent over the cost-benefit
structure of time allocation to productive and non-productive activities such as schooling
(Bock, 2002a). A child might want to spend more time acquiring skills necessary for
future productivity, whereas a parent might need the child’s labor immediately to support
other offspring.

Children’s responses to increasing household labor demand
Chayanov (1966 [1925]) first demonstrated that variation in the family’s age-sex
structure affects variation in labor requirements and production. Specifically, low
consumer-worker ratios lead to the expectation of low work levels and vice versa. This
framework has been applied extensively to examine effects of demographic changes as
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children enter and leave the natal household on overall family production (e.g., Chibnik,
1984; Durrenberger, 1980) and children’s production in particular (Munroe et al., 1984).
In a rare application of Chayanov’s model using empirical data among Maya
agriculturalists, Lee and Kramer (2002) show that children’s labor supply is necessary to
subsidize parental reproduction, particularly in the later childbearing years. At first
glance, this would appear to support the argument that high fertility is an adaptive
response to increasing household labor demand in pre-demographic transition societies
(Cain, 1977; Caldwell, 1982). However, careful analyses show that net wealth flows
downward from parents to offspring and from grandparents to grandoffspring (Kaplan,
1994; Kaplan et al., 2009; Lee and Kramer, 2002). Due to the paucity of research into
children’s resource transfers, the extent to which a child lowers parental subsidy required
for co-resident siblings remains unclear. Nevertheless, the conclusion that older children
offset a substantial percentage of the consumption demands of younger siblings suggests
that children’s work is biased toward family- rather than ego-directed production. But the
question remains, to what extent is the child’s time allocation a result of parental
manipulation, how might manipulation be harmful to the child, and how might the child
attempt to counter manipulative attempts?

Life history theory and household labor allocation
Fertility has the greatest direct effect on an organism’s fitness. All else equal, an
increase in fertility increases fitness. Two fundamental trade-offs influence natural
selection on fertility (Charnov, 1993; Lessells, 1991; Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992). The
first trade-off is between present and future reproduction. By growing, an organism
increases its rate of future energy acquisition, and that energy can then be allocated
toward reproduction. Organisms therefore generally have a juvenile phase characterized
by zero fertility until they attain a size where energy allocated toward reproduction has a
greater positive effect on fitness than continued growth. The second trade-off is between
quantity and quality of offspring, where quality is defined as investment directly
impacting offspring survival and reproduction. Natural selection is expected to result in
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parental investment strategies that maximize the number of reproducing descendants
(Smith and Fretwell, 1974).
Building upon these insights, Kaplan and colleagues (e.g., Gurven and Kaplan,
2006; Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan et al., 2000) have recently proposed the embodied capital
theory of human life history evolution. This framework treats processes of growth,
development, and maintenance as investments in stock of growth-based or experiencebased embodied capital. Physical traits including size, strength, and coordination
represent growth-based embodied capital, whereas cognitive traits like memory and
specific skills and knowledge represent experience-based embodied capital. Energy
allocation to maintenance can likewise be considered an investment in embodied capital
since these attributes generally decrease with age. We can therefore conceptualize the
present-future reproductive trade-off as optimal investments in personal embodied capital
versus reproduction, and the quantity-quality trade-off as optimal investments in the
embodied capital of offspring versus their number.
Benefits generated by the child from any given productive activity will vary in
their effect on parental fitness through the ability to invest in embodied capital of the
entire sibship. Compared to ego-directed productive activities, benefits generated from
family-directed productive activities are more equitably distributed among kin over time.
The child cannot monopolize returns from task performance to invest in personal
embodied capital at the expense of investment in growth-based embodied capital of
siblings. As a result, variance in effects on parental fitness across family-directed
productive tasks is relatively low.
Ego-directed productive activities, however, yield greater variance in their effect
on parental fitness across tasks. Kin-directed altruism is a byproduct, not a necessary
component, of ego-directed task performance. Therefore, for some ego-directed tasks the
child can monopolize benefits to invest in personal embodied capital at the expense of
investment in growth-based embodied capital of siblings. For example, children’s
hunting is primarily an investment in skill acquisition. From a preliminary sample of 74
Tsimane’ children aged 7 to 18 that attempted to hunt, over 50% were unsuccessful and
nearly 25% produced nothing despite hunting for over 10 total hours during the sample
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period (median number of days sampled = 59, unpublished data). Yet when successful,
calories are used to provision at least one household member (and sometimes many).
Other ego-directed productive tasks, however, do not generate byproduct material
benefits used to invest in embodied capital of kin. Contrast hunting with manufacturing a
necklace or sewing one’s clothing. In the latter examples, a parent has little ability to use
the benefits of task performance to invest in embodied capital of other offspring.

Hypotheses and predictions
The child’s time allocation is of interest to parents because activities vary in their
effects on parental fitness. Benefits of the child’s labor include investment in growthbased embodied capital of the focal child and/or siblings, and investment in personal
experience-based embodied capital during task performance (on-the-job training). Costs
of the child’s labor include foregone production from other work and the inability to
acquire other skills (Bock, 2002a, b). Parent-offspring conflict theory generates the
hypothesis that a parent will manipulate the child’s time in a manner that maximizes
parental fitness (Trivers, 1974). Parent-offspring conflict is more likely to occur over
ego- as opposed to family-directed production since the former yields fewer benefits used
to invest in embodied capital of the entire sibship. When labor demands are relatively
small, benefits of time allocation to family-directed production may rarely surpass those
to ego-directed production or leisure from either the child’s or parent’s perspective. In
theory, parent-offspring conflict over the child’s time will be absent in families with onlychildren due to the absence of relatedness asymmetries (assuming that the parent can no
longer reproduce).
This leads to the hypothesis that as family labor demands increase, a parent will
increasingly manipulate the child’s time in a manner that maximizes investment in
embodied capital of the entire sibship. This hypothesis generates the following
predictions: 1) time allocation to ego-directed production generating fewer benefits used
to invest in growth-based embodied capital of offspring will decrease with number of
younger siblings; 2) time allocation to family-directed production will increase with
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number of younger siblings; and 3) time allocation to non-productive activities will
decrease with number of younger siblings.
Finally, we develop and preliminarily test the hypothesis that increases in family
labor demand result in greater parent-offspring conflict over optimal levels of children’s
kin-directed altruism. If children’s time allocation is indeed the result of manipulation to
maximize parental fitness, even at the expense of a particular child, then we might expect
the child to counter manipulative attempts by lowering the risk of task delegation. A
subsequent decrease in time allocation to family-directed production would enable the
child to engage in more ego-directed pursuits facilitating investment in personal
embodied capital. In the study population, mothers assign the vast majority of tasks and
are more likely to delegate family-directed rather than ego-directed tasks (Stieglitz et al.,
n.d.). As a result, we predict that time spent in close proximity to the mother while the
child is not working will decrease with number of younger siblings.

Methods
The ethnographic setting
The Tsimane’ are forager-farmers inhabiting the rainforests and savannas located
between the towns of San Borja and San Ignacio de Moxos in the Beni department of
central lowland Bolivia. The majority of villages are dispersed along the banks of the
Maniqui River, but a substantial number of communities are also settled beside the
Cuverene, Matto, Yacuma, Apere, and Sécure rivers. Villages vary in exposure to the
market economy, range in size from roughly 10 to 100 households, and are composed of
residential clusters of extended families.
Children have numerous opportunities to assist families from an early age.
Examples of common productive activities include harvesting cultigens, fishing,
collecting fruit, gathering water/firewood, processing foods, and weaving (bags, mats,
fans, etc). Opportunities for wage labor with loggers and ranchers are sporadic and males
begin such activities at around age 15. Schools exist in about two-thirds of communities
and were present in four of the six sampled villages. Children start attending school by
age five and continue until their mid-teens. When children are not in school or assisting
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kin, they are often playing in mixed-age and sex groups, visiting other households, or
otherwise interacting with peers. Play typically involves manipulating objects, chasing
others, “playing house,” or climbing trees. Boys also frequently shoot miniature arrows
with bows fashioned for target practice. Many children (and adults) play soccer on a
daily basis too. This represents one of the few competitive and rule-governed forms of
recreation.
Play represents younger children’s preferred alternative to performing delegated
work (see chapter three). A shift from prioritizing play to socialization and other idle
activities at the expense of delegated task performance is increasingly evident with age
for both sexes. Among adolescent girls, resting and eating are equally or more important
than socializing, possibly indicating the importance of fat deposition prior to girls’ entry
into the marriage market. Disputes between parents and adolescent daughters over
marrying early and withdrawing assistance from the natal household are not uncommon.
Although less frequent, quarrels between parents and older sons occur over the diversion
of work effort from the natal household and toward prospective mates/affinal kin instead.
Bride service is not officially recognized, but the husband is generally expected to work
with affines in daily subsistence tasks during the first few years of marriage.

Time allocation
Time allocation data were collected in the communities of Aperecito, Cuverene,
Munday, and Cosincho between June 2002 and June 2003 and in Tacuaral del Matto and
Jamanchi Uno throughout 2005. Residential clusters were sampled randomly without
replacement from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. during three-hour time blocks in 2002 to 2003
and two-hour time blocks in 2005. The activity, location, and social partners of each
individual present in the cluster were recorded every 30 minutes. Social partners were
defined as individuals either within two meters or directly socializing with the focal
individual. If someone was not present during the scan, a relative was asked about the
individual’s activity and location.
To eliminate confounds in the relationship between household composition and
time allocation due to the presence of more distant kin (e.g., half siblings), only children
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residing with biological parents and full siblings are included in analyses. Visitors to
clusters are also excluded from the risk set because their motives for being present might
differ from those living in the cluster. In addition, we excluded scans in which children
were accompanying kin, on overnight trips away from the village, or in wage labor.
Productive activities were aggregated to examine variation in time allocation to
ego- and family-directed production as household labor demand increases. Since
individuals could be coded as engaging in two activities simultaneously, one could
theoretically spend 100% of the time in ego- and family-directed production. Hunting,
fishing, and collecting fruit were classified as ego-directed food acquisition because kindirected caloric benefits are not a necessary component of task performance.
Manufacture and washing clothes were classified as ego-directed domestic work, even
though the recipient of each activity was unknown (wives are usually responsible for
washing clothing of husbands and children; see results section for a justification of
manufacture). Horticultural labor, sibcare, and all other domestic tasks (e.g., cleaning
house, processing rice, gathering firewood/water) were classified as family-directed
production. Non-productive activities were aggregated into two categories, idling and
visitation of households outside the residential cluster. We do not include play in
analyses because younger siblings are often indirect objects of children’s play and
because play with younger siblings can be considered a form of direct sibcare. This
would obscure the hypothesized relationships between household labor demand and time
allocation to non-productive activities.

Age and sibship composition
From 2002 to 2005, over 300 interviews were conducted by MG in the sample
communities as part of a larger project on Tsimane’ life history and health. Birth years
and genealogies were assigned based on a combination of established systematic methods
(Blurton Jones et al., 2002; Hill and Hurtado, 1996; Howell, 1979). These include using
known ages from written accounts, relative age lists, dated events, photo comparisons of
people with known ages, and cross-validation of information from independent
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interviews of kin. Methods are described at length elsewhere (Gurven et al., 2007). From
these data we determined ages and household composition.

Data analysis
We used the generalized estimating equations (GEE) method to test for the effects
of number of younger siblings on children’s time allocation to productive and nonproductive activities. This method provides a way to analyze correlated dependent
variables arising from repeated measures, controlling for each individual. All analyses
use a binary distribution, exchangeable correlation structure, report parameter estimates
as logit estimates, and use a dichotomous behavioral variable as the response (e.g.,
sibcare, yes or no). Analyses were performed in SPSS 16.0.

Results
Descriptives
The sample consisted of 17,708 observational scans of 274 children yielding a
mean of 64.63 scans per child and a mean age of 9.9. The mean number of co-resident
younger full siblings is 2.7 (SD = 1.7, minimum = 0, maximum = 8), and the mean
number of co-resident older full siblings is 1.6 (SD = 1.5, minimum = 0, maximum = 7).
Multicollinearity between age, number of younger siblings, and number of older siblings
warrants some concern given fairly strong intercorrelations (e.g., rage, # younger siblings = 0.54,
p<0.001). To address this issue we conducted a weighted least squares regression of each
variable on the other two (weighted by number of scans per child). For example, age was
regressed on number of younger siblings and number of older siblings. We then
examined the tolerance, or proportion of variance in each variable that is not accounted
for by the other variables. Tolerance values from the three regressions ranged from 0.7 to
0.84 and it was considered reasonable to include all three variables in subsequent GEE
analyses.
Table 4.1 displays time allocation to work and selected non-productive activities
by age and sex. During early childhood boys balance work effort between domestic tasks
and food acquisition, concentrating on the latter with age. Girls focus mostly on domestic
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work with greater time devoted to sibcare and food production with age. Children
specialize in work that facilitates on-the-job training for sex-specific adult roles, resulting
in boys spending more time in ego-directed production (χ² = 82.26, df = 1, p<0.001; also
see Figures 4.1 and 4.21). Boys spend significantly more time hunting, fishing, and
collecting forest foods, whereas girls spend more time in sibcare and family-directed
domestic tasks. No significant sex difference emerges with respect to time spent in
horticultural labor. Time allocation to play and social visitation is significantly greater
among boys, while girls spend more time in idle activities.

Table 4.1. Time allocation (proportion of time) to selected activities by age and sex
Activity
Hunt
Fish
Forage
Garden
Sibcare
Domestic
work
Play
Idle
Visit

Age 4 to 8
Males Females
<0.01 0.0
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03

Age 9 to 13
Males Females
0.02
<0.01
0.13
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.05
0.01
0.07

Age 14 to 18
Males Females
0.05
0.01
0.1
0.05
0.01
0.02
0.09
0.08
<0.01 0.06

Total
Males Females
0.02
<0.01
0.08
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.04
0.01
0.05

0.1

0.1

0.11

0.19

0.14

0.3

0.11

0.18

0.29
0.29
0.05

0.23
0.38
0.05

0.19
0.23
0.07

0.11
0.27
0.06

0.08
0.24
0.09

0.03
0.27
0.03

0.21
0.26
0.06

0.14
0.31
0.05

1

Food processing scans in which the primary beneficiary is ambiguous are omitted
from the risk set.
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Figure 4.1. Time allocation to work by category and age: Boys
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Figure 4.2. Time allocation to work by category and age: Girls

Time allocation to ego- and family-directed production
The probability of working increases with number of younger siblings controlling
for age, sex, number of older siblings, and community but the effect is not significant
(Table 4.2). Removing scans in which children were visiting does not change the effect
of number of younger siblings (B = 0.032, p = 0.261 using the same controls). To
examine whether children bias time allocation toward ego- versus family-directed
production as household labor demand increases, we first regressed number of younger
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siblings on the probability of engaging in labor primarily benefitting the child. As shown
in table 4.3, children do not significantly increase time allocation to hunting, all egodirected food acquisition, or all ego-directed work as number of younger siblings
increases. In contrast, the probability of engaging in manufacture significantly decreases
with number of younger siblings. Converting the logit estimates into probabilities (using
sample means for controls) shows that children without co-resident younger siblings are
three times more likely to engage in manufacture than children with five younger siblings
(3% versus 1%). Of all manufacturing scans in which the direct object was specified,
nearly 50% included items for recreational use lacking immediate kin-directed benefits
(e.g., miniature bows/arrows, slingshots, necklaces, rings, toys). For the remainder of
scans, the recipient of the manufactured object was unknown (e.g., woven bags, fans).

Table 4.2. General estimating equations (GEE) analysis of the effect of number of
younger siblings on the probability of working (n = 17,708 scans, 274 children)
Parameter
Intercept
Age
Sex = male
Number of co-resident younger full siblings
Number of co-resident older full siblings
Community
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B
-1.75
0.108
-0.265
0.043
-0.046

SE
0.181
0.011
0.071
0.029
0.028

Wald χ2
93.179
93.262
13.977
2.224
2.827
1.458

p
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.136
0.093
0.227

Table 4.3. GEE analysis of the effect of number of younger siblings on the probability of engaging in
selected ego-directed work (n = 17,708 scans, 274 children)

Parameter
Intercept
Age
Sex = male
Number of co-resident
younger full siblings
Number of co-resident
older full siblings
Community
1

All ego-directed
Hunting
food acquisition
Manufacture
p
p
p
B
B
B
-9.026 <0.001 -2.899 <0.001 -4.943 <0.001
0.201 <0.001 0.048 0.019 0.169 <0.001
1.664 0.001 0.732 <0.001 -0.324 0.035

All ego-directed
work1
p
B
-2.707 <0.001
0.089
<0.001
0.355
0.002

0.118

0.112

0.064

0.156

-0.113

0.024

0.015

0.686

-0.172

0.279

-0.18

0.001

-0.123

0.067

-0.173

<0.001

0.035

0.06

0.464

0.354

Food processing scans in which the primary beneficiary of task performance is ambiguous are omitted
from the risk set. The analysis includes 16,942 scans for 274 children.

Compared to time allocation to ego-directed production, number of younger
siblings has more robust effects on time spent in family-directed production. The
probability of engaging in horticultural labor significantly increases with number of
younger siblings (Table 4.4). Children without co-resident younger siblings were over
two times less likely to engage in horticultural labor than children with five younger
siblings (4% versus 10%, using sample means for controls). In addition, the probability
of providing sibcare marginally increases with number of younger siblings. Unlike all
ego-directed work, the probability of engaging in all family-directed work significantly
increases with number of younger siblings controlling for other factors (Table 4.4; also
see Figure 4.3).
These results highlight a shift in children’s activity budgets toward engaging in
tasks providing greater kin-directed gains when more dependent siblings can benefit.
This is despite the fact that time allocation to certain forms of horticultural labor and
sibcare might not exhibit monotonic increases with number of younger siblings since
multiple individuals simultaneously benefit from the same activity (e.g., field clearance,
tending children). Indeed, many family-directed domestic tasks (e.g., house construction,
making chicha, etc.) provide non-depreciable or “umbrella” benefits, which might help
explain why the probability of engaging in family-directed domestic work does not
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increase with number of younger siblings (B = -0.022, p = 0.505, controlling for age, sex,
number of older siblings, and community).
Table 4.4. GEE analysis of the effect of number of younger siblings on the probability
of engaging in selected family-directed work (n = 17,708 scans, 274 children)

Parameter
Intercept
Age
Age²
Sex = male
Number of co-resident
younger full siblings
Number of co-resident
older full siblings
Community

Garden
p
B
-4.963 <0.001
0.15
<0.001
--0.068 0.679

Sibcare
p
B
-5.263 <0.001
0.502 <0.001
-0.023 <0.001
-2.076 <0.001

All familydirected work2
p
B
-2.63
<0.001
0.092 <0.001
---0.732 <0.001

0.173

0.002

0.129

0.073

0.072

0.018

0.233

0.002

-0.146

0.111

0.043

0.228

<0.001

1

0.503

0.48

1

Scans in which children were not directly observed are omitted from the risk set (n = 8,828
scans, 250 children).
2
Food processing scans in which the primary beneficiary of task performance is ambiguous are
omitted from the risk set (n = 16,960 scans, 274 children).

Proportion of time

0.16
0.15
0.14
Ego-directed work

0.13

Family-directed work

0.12
0.11
0.1
0

1

2

3

4

5

Number of co-resident younger full
siblings

Figure 4.3. Projected proportion of time spent working by number of younger siblings
and primary beneficiary of task performance (using sample means for controls)
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Time allocation to leisure and in close proximity to mother
To further explore whether children bias activity budgets as family labor demand
increases, we regressed number of younger siblings on the probability of engaging in
selected leisure activities. As predicted, the probability of engaging in idle activities
significantly decreases with number of younger siblings (Table 4.5). Children without
co-resident younger siblings were 1.3 times more likely to be idling than children with
five younger siblings (36% versus 28% using sample means for controls). In addition,
time spent in social visitation significantly declines with number of younger siblings,
such that children without co-resident younger siblings were over 1.5 times more likely to
visit households outside of the residential cluster than children with five younger siblings
(8% versus 5% using sample means for controls). Removing scans in which children
were engaged in horticultural labor or sibcare does not drastically change the effect of
number of younger siblings (B = -0.065, p = 0.066 using the same controls with idle as
the dependent variable; B = -0.102, p = 0.025 using the same controls with visit as the
dependent variable).

Table 4.5. GEE analysis of the effect of number of younger siblings on the probability of
engaging in selected leisure (n = 17,708 scans, 274 children)
Idle
Parameter
Intercept
Age
Sex = male
Number of co-resident
younger full siblings
Number of co-resident older
full siblings
Community

B
-0.141
-0.026
-0.202

p
0.562
0.061
0.009

Visiting
p
B
-2.449 <0.001
0.027 0.195
0.103 0.512

-0.076

0.036

-0.111

0.014

-0.024

0.438

-0.222

<0.001

0.072

0.786

These results, coupled with the fact that children are more likely to engage in
family-directed production at the expense of ego-directed production as household labor
demand increases, suggest manipulation of the child’s time by the parent. To test the
hypothesis that increases in family labor demand result in greater parent-offspring conflict
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over optimal levels of children’s kin-directed altruism, we regressed number of younger
siblings on the probability of being directly observed in close proximity to the mother
while not working. Indeed, restricting the risk set to observations in which both the
mother and child were in/around the house, number of younger siblings significantly
lowers the probability of being in close proximity to the mother controlling for other
factors (Table 4.6). Converting the logit estimates into probabilities using sample means
for controls shows that children without co-resident younger siblings were 1.4 times more
likely to be in close proximity to the mother compared to children with five co-resident
younger siblings (48% versus 34%). Removing scans where children were receiving care
does not change the significance of the effect of number of younger siblings (B = -0.116,
p<0.001).

Table 4.6. GEE analysis of the effect of number of younger siblings on the probability of
being observed in close proximity to the mother in/around the house while not working (n
= 6,095 scans, 234 children)
Parameter
Intercept
Age
Sex = male
Number of co-resident younger full siblings
Number of co-resident older full siblings
Community

B
0.057
0.009
-0.316
-0.115
-0.025

SE
0.169
0.012
0.081
0.032
0.027

Wald χ2
0.115
0.505
15.048
13.383
0.889
27.512

p
0.734
0.477
<0.001
<0.001
0.346
<0.001

Discussion
Tsimane’ boys and girls engage in similar forms of household production in early
childhood and specialize in complementary tasks with age. Time allocation to overall
and family-directed production is significantly greater among girls, whereas time
allocation to ego-directed production is greater among boys. These sex differences in
labor allocation reflect investment in personal experience-based embodied capital
necessary to achieve adult competence.
In a species characterized by prolonged offspring dependence, simultaneous
investment in multiple offspring of different ages, and allomaternal assistance from older
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children, parent-offspring conflict is likely to occur at times other than weaning (Bateson,
1994). Our results suggest that parents leverage children’s time in order to maximize
parental fitness. As household labor demand increases children exhibit a tendency to
increase production, but only with respect to kin-directed tasks. Number of younger
siblings positively predicts time spent in garden labor, sibcare, and all forms of familydirected production. Such activities offset the cost of childcare to parents by generating
benefits (energy, child protection, etc.) used to invest in growth-based embodied capital
of the entire sibship.
Effects of increasing labor demand on time allocation to ego-directed production
are less consistent. On the one hand, ego-directed production has a lower positive effect
on parental fitness than family-directed production because fewer kin benefit from such
labor. However, across different ego-directed productive tasks, the degree to which a
child can reap all or most benefits from task performance to invest in personal embodied
capital at the expense of investment in growth-based embodied capital of siblings will
vary. Despite primarily being an investment in personal embodied capital, ego-directed
food acquisition can generate byproduct benefits used to invest in growth-based
embodied capital of offspring. We therefore might not expect these activities to run
wholly counter to parental interests, especially since the child simultaneously accumulates
skills critical to achieving adult competence during task performance. We find that time
allocation to hunting and all forms of ego-directed food acquisition increases with
number of younger siblings but the effect is not significant. In contrast, time allocation to
manufacture significantly declines with number of younger siblings. This indicates that
ego-directed productive activities heavily weighted against generating byproduct kindirected benefits are devalued from the parent’s perspective. Taken together, these results
are consistent with the hypothesis that parents manipulate the child’s time in a manner
that maximizes investment in embodied capital of the entire sibship.
Analyses of children’s time allocation to non-productive activities as a function of
household labor demand provides further evidence in support of this hypothesis. Parents
are especially likely to devalue forms of leisure in which the benefits obtained are used to
invest in the child’s embodied capital at the expense of investment in other offspring (as
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opposed to playing with younger siblings). Indeed, we find that number of younger
siblings negatively predicts time allocation to social visitation and idle behaviors that
include grooming, socializing with, and eating/resting in close proximity to peers. This
indicates that children in families with greater labor demands might experience
compromised peer relations due to a lower frequency of peer interaction. While the
extent to which reduced childhood leisure opportunities impact long-term social
competence is an open question, the importance of stable peer relations in enhancing
conflict resolution skills, a sense of intimacy and empathy, and self-esteem among
children in modern societies is well established (Franco and Levitt, 1998). Our results
suggest that manipulation of the child’s behavior to maximize parental fitness might have
a deleterious longitudinal psychosocial effect on the child.
The hypothesis that the frequency of parent-child interaction decreases due, in
part, to the child’s desire to avoid delegated work has been suggested previously (Draper,
1975; Draper and Cashdan, 1988). Such work focused on effects of the transition from a
foraging to a sedentary lifestyle on parent-child social interactions among the !Kung.
Patterns of frequent adult-child interactions in the foraging !Kung transformed into
sedentary children’s preferences to engage with peers rather than adults, presumably
because sedentary children were delegated work more frequently.
We suggest a refinement to this hypothesis. Our model limits this line of
reasoning to delegated family-directed work in which the child cannot reap all/most
benefits to invest in personal embodied capital at the expense of investment in growthbased embodied capital of siblings. We therefore restate the hypothesis as follows:
increases in family labor demand result in greater parent-offspring conflict over optimal
levels of children’s kin-directed altruism. As a preliminary test of this hypothesis, we
find that number of younger co-resident siblings negatively predicts time spent in close
proximity to the mother controlling for other factors. If parental manipulation of the
child’s time entails engaging in sub-optimal levels of kin-directed production from the
child’s perspective, then maternal avoidance might represent an attempt to combat
behavioral manipulation by lowering the risk of task delegation and creating opportunities
to engage in ego-directed pursuits (productive or non-productive). This suggests that
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parental manipulation of the child’s behavior has negative consequences for the child’s
relations among both peers and kin.
It is not immediately clear as to whether children are independently responding to
household need or if they are doing so under the influence of parental direction. While it
is likely a combination of both, this study provides further evidence that decisions
regarding children’s time allocation reflect a trade-off between productive and nonproductive activities that varies with household labor demand (Bock, 2002a, b; Bock and
Johnson, 2004; Stieglitz et al., n.d.). Of course, household need is only one factor
influencing variation in children’s time allocation and a more complete understanding
would require examination of socioecological and individual factors. For example,
children’s relative productivity across seasons (Blurton Jones et al., 1994; Kaplan, 1997)
or child characteristics may interact with household need to influence variation in the
management of time allocation. Are children from families with higher dependency
ratios given fewer opportunities to invest in personal embodied capital during times when
children can substantially invest in growth-based embodied capital of siblings (e.g., the
rice harvest)? Do children living with distant kin or unrelated individuals receive greater
pressure to engage in family-directed production as household labor demand increases?
Because these tests were observational, causality cannot be directly inferred and
alternative explanations must be considered. For example, it might be that children from
families with greater labor demands are more industrious, yielding a spurious association
between number of younger siblings and time allocation to family-directed production
and leisure. This would confound the hypothesized relationship between household labor
demand and manipulation of the child’s time to maximize parental fitness. But the fact
that number of younger siblings does not predict time allocation to all forms of work
suggests otherwise (Table 4.2). It also might be that the lower frequency of mother-child
interaction in families with greater labor demand is not the result of greater parentoffspring conflict over behavioral manipulation. Less frequent mother-child interaction,
whether initiated by the child or the mother, might help ensure that the mother’s work
proceeds unobstructed (Munroe and Munroe, 1977). However, the probability of being
directly observed in close proximity to the mother actually increases if the mother is
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parenting a sibling (B = 0.394, p<0.001, parenting = yes) and is not associated with the
mother’s involvement in food processing (B = 0.059, p = 0.259, food processing = yes)
controlling for age, sex, and community.
Overall, increasing household labor demand appears to have a substantial impact
on the behavior of children—decisions that might be made independently or on their
behalf. Regardless, it is clear that such decisions can ultimately lead to varying outcomes
in the adult lives of children through birth-order effects on personality (Beer and Horn,
2000; Healey and Ellis, 2007; Sulloway, 1996). Furthermore, the varying potential for
parent-offspring conflict beyond weaning that is predicted by evolutionary theory presents
an exciting area for exploration. For instance, how does such conflict affect the quality of
parent-offspring relationships or adult personalities? Are there interactions between
children’s individual characteristics and household composition that predict disobedience
or delinquency? Are these factors associated with the likelihood of abuse or neglect?
Clearly, an evolutionary framework has much to offer the field of family studies, a
research area that has a long history yet little mention of Darwinian theory.
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CHAPTER 5: SPOUSAL VIOLENCE AND PATERNAL DISINVESTMENT

Introduction
Spousal violence is the most common form of family violence (Levinson, 1989).
A recent WHO study in 10 countries reported a lifetime prevalence of partner violence
against women ranging from 13 – 61% and an annual prevalence varying between 3 –
29% (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006). In the United States over 7,000,000 women in
marriage or common law partnership were estimated to be physically abused by partners
in 2005 (using recomputed rates in Straus, 2005; US Census Bureau 2006). In addition to
blunt trauma, health consequences for abused women include gynecological problems,
adverse pregnancy outcomes, depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (see
Heise et al., 1994a and references therein). Children of abused women also exhibit low
birth weight and higher early mortality (Jejeebhoy, 1998; Murphy et al., 2001). Spousal
violence raises public health and human rights concerns worldwide, yet few detailed
studies of spousal conflict in small-scale, non-industrialized societies exist.
Our paper incorporates cultural and evolutionary approaches to the study of
spousal violence in a relatively egalitarian, kin-based society of forager-farmers
undergoing rapid acculturation. Quantitative studies of spousal abuse are biased toward
samples from industrialized settings where most violence occurs behind closed doors.
While biomedical and social scientists have stressed the importance of collecting
systematic information on spousal violence in non-Western countries (e.g., Erchak, 1984;
Heise et al., 1994b; Koenig et al., 2003), no study to our knowledge has quantitatively
examined violence against women in a society with limited residential privacy, little
inheritable wealth, and low variance in socioeconomic status and education.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes previous studies
of spousal violence. Subsequently, we present a path model for predicting the frequency
of violence against married Tsimane’ women. We then introduce the ethnographic
setting, our methodology, and present the results. We conclude with a discussion of the
major motivation behind men’s use of violence in marriage.
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Cultural studies of spousal violence
Early work (Lester, 1980; Levinson, 1989) emphasizes positive correlations
between frequency of spousal violence and degree of power asymmetry between the
sexes, usually defined as marital restrictions imposed upon women and men’s control of
wealth. These and other studies highlight historical relationships between patriarchal
institutions and violence against women (e.g., Yllö, 1984). In societies lacking
centralized legal and political systems, ideology and traditional practices reify men’s
dominance and use of force to control women. For example, among Lusi-Kaliai
horticulturalists of Papua New Guinea, men discipline wives through beatings if women
draw blood while punishing children or fail to perform domestic responsibilities (Counts,
1999). Violent reprisals by husbands and other kin following women’s resistance to
arranged marriages have also been documented (McDowell, 1999; Shostak, 1981).
Other studies highlight individual risk factors for women experiencing partner
violence. These include young age of either spouse (e.g., Jejeebhoy and Cook, 1997; Kim
and Cho, 1992; Naved and Persson, 2005), and husband’s substance abuse (Fawole et al.,
2005; Hoffman et al., 1994; Rao, 1997), controlling behaviors (Garcia-Moreno et al.,
2006), adherence to traditional norms limiting gender equality (Hollander, 2005; Koenig
et al., 2006), involvement in extramarital affairs (Hollander 2005) and sexual jealousy
(e.g., Buss, 2000; Counts et al., 1999; Daly and Wilson, 1988; Figueredo and McCloskey,
1993; Shackelford et al., 2005). Most epidemiological studies, however, only report
associations and lack a cogent theoretical framework.
In contrast to those characteristics precipitating men’s violence against married
women are factors providing protective effects, such as matrilocal or extended family
residence (Counts et al., 1999; Erchak, 1984; Figueredo et al., 2001; Whiting and
Whiting, 1975), higher levels of education of either spouse (Jejeebhoy and Cook, 1997;
Koenig et al., 2003; Straus et al., 1980), and higher socioeconomic status of the couple
(Hoffman et al., 1994; Jejeebhoy and Cook, 1997; Kim and Cho, 1992; Koenig et al.,
2003). While the presence of genetic children also stabilizes marital relations in
traditional and modern societies in terms of lowering rates of divorce and men’s
extramarital affairs (Anderson et al., 2007; Winking et al., 2007), the extent to which
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joint dependent offspring presence influences the frequency of spousal violence remains
unclear.

Evolutionary studies of spousal conflict and violence
Among sexually reproducing species, males and females have conflicting
reproductive interests and asymmetries in parental investment (Trivers, 1972). Females
produce larger, more energetically expensive gametes and almost always invest greater
amounts of time and energy in offspring than males. Female reproductive success is
limited by access to resources critical for reproduction whereas male reproductive success
is constrained by access to fertile females. Among most mammals, male investment in
reproduction is limited to courtship and copulation (i.e. mating effort), rather than
provisioning and care (i.e. parenting effort). Mating opportunities may be obtained by
successful courtship or through coercive means involving aggression. Sexual coercion
may increase the likelihood that a female will mate with an aggressive male, or lower the
probability that a female will mate with rival males (Smuts, 1992). Among chimpanzees,
sexual coercion appears to be the primary motivation underlying male aggression towards
females (Muller et al., 2009).
Unlike most other primates, humans form long-term pair bonds characterized by
high levels of male investment. Human infants are highly altricial and require almost
constant attention and care throughout the first few years of life. The need for such care
lowers the efficiency of foraging mothers (Hurtado et al., 1992). Offspring remain
nutritionally dependent until their late teens among hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists
(Kaplan, 1994; Kramer, 2005) and so adults into their 50s must provide for several
dependents of different ages simultaneously (Gurven and Walker, 2006; Lancaster and
Lancaster, 1983; Lee and Kramer, 2002).
Two prominent explanations have been proposed for the relatively high levels of
human male investment in offspring (reviewed in Winking et al., 2007). One view,
sometimes referred to as the mating effort model of marriage, proposes that men marry to
gain and maintain access to women’s fertility rather than enhance offspring quality.
According to this view, men could more efficiently provision families by targeting lower
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variance resources that are not widely shared (e.g., palm starch, small game). The fact
that men pursue large game suggests that foraging men aim not to invest in offspring but
rather to gain social and mating benefits through costly signals of hunting prowess and
meat sharing. Another view, often referred to as the provisioning model of marriage,
proposes that men marry because marriage facilitates a sexual division of labor and the
provisioning of biparental care. According to this view, the greater paternity confidence
resulting from sexually exclusive partnership enables men to direct investment in their
own children. Given the substantial costs to parents of rearing children, marriage
increases the payoffs to economic specialization in which men focus on hunting and other
productive activities and women concentrate on childcare and economic tasks compatible
with childcare. The need to support multiple dependent offspring increases returns to
continued investment in the marital union and reduces temptations to mate desertion well
beyond the reproductive years for both sexes. Individuals that divorce and remarry during
the period of shared parental investment face conflicts of interest with new spouses over
resource allocation. These potential conflicts increase the benefits of spouses staying
together and having all or most of their children together. Investigation of the conditions
under which men strive to obtain fertility benefits at the expense of familial investment
can be used to test predictions of the two models of marriage and shed light on situations
increasing the risk of spousal conflict and violence against women.
Given the relatively high levels of human male parental investment, sexual
jealousy and concerns over paternity have been proposed as important factors motivating
violence or hostility against women (Burch and Gallup Jr., 2000; Chagnon, 1992; Daly
and Wilson, 1988; Goetz, 2008). Although men and women report a similar intensity of
jealous emotions during recalls of potential infidelity (Shackelford et al., 2000), men are
more consistently concerned with sexual infidelity by their partners while women are
more concerned over emotional infidelity (Buss, 2000). This sex difference is consistent
with an evolved male psychology attuned to the potential loss of paternity, and an evolved
female psychology attuned to cues of diverted investment from offspring.
Humans lived as hunter-gatherers for most of evolutionary history. The study of
modern foragers can offer insights into the selective pressures that shaped the evolved
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psychology generating men’s physically abusive behaviors towards women without
confounds found in modern societies (e.g., greater variance in education and wealth,
residential privacy and isolation from natal kin, etc.). At the same time, however, the
Tsimane’ and most subsistence-level societies worldwide continue to experience greater
levels of assimilation into broader market economies. These local transformations
provide a means to explore the effects of changes in household production and control of
wealth due to men’s village absenteeism from wage labor on spousal conflict and
violence.

Strategic use of violence
Despite the collaborative nature of human pair bonds, interests of husbands and
wives will not coincide under all circumstances. There is room for much conflict of
interest within cooperative unions (Bird, 1999; Gurven et al., In press), often resulting
from failure of one partner to meet the expectations of the other, differences in
perceptions of what those expectations should be, and conflicts over suspected
infidelities. The use of violence by husbands can therefore be viewed as a “strategy”
employed by some men to control women’s behaviors. Control need not be limited to the
reproductive domain, as in preventing or punishing sexual infidelity; violence may be
used to influence behavioral outcomes in any domain, so that a wife is more likely to
defer to her husband’s immediate goals, while setting a precedent for future deference.
Any circumstances where spousal interests diverge resulting in different opinions
over the proper use of family resources may invite coercive tactics. We would expect one
partner’s desires to enhance fitness at the expense of the welfare of other household
members to be a major source of conflict, raising the risk of spousal violence. An
example of potentially divergent interests occurs when a spouse invests in offspring from
another partner, either from a previous or polygynous marriage. Manifestations of
conflict and violence between parents and step-children (e.g., Daly and Wilson, 1988;
Flinn, 1988), between partners with children from previous relationships (Daly et al.,
1993, 1997), and involving co-wives and polygynously married husbands (Jankowiak et
al., 2005) are well documented.
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Another example of conflicting spousal interests occurs through the pursuit of
extramarital affairs, either directly or indirectly through investment in status that might
improve one’s chances of obtaining future extramarital partners. Among the study
population, access to and reliance on market goods is increasing and women rarely earn
wages. Money represents a scarce yet fungible resource that is seldom saved and can
easily be squandered by men to increase reproductive success and status. Resources
invested in the pursuit of extramarital affairs are unavailable for investment in the family.
As a result, men face a trade-off between investment in offspring within marriage and the
fertility benefits of extramarital affairs. We refer to the suite of men’s behaviors
facilitating resource diversions from the family as paternal disinvestment.
Despite the use of violence as a potentially effective means of coercion, there are
great costs to spousal abuse that should restrict its occurrence among a social species
engaging in long-term unions. These include bodily injury to the aggressor if violence
provokes retaliation by the wife or disgruntled affinal kin. Spousal abuse could also
result in divorce and the loss of future reproductive opportunities with a wife. Even if the
wife remains committed to an abusive partner due, for example, to constraints on
alternative mate choice or costs of leaving due to children’s vulnerabilities, violence
contributes to marital strife. This, in turn, could lead women to reduce work effort or
inadequately perform tasks as a means of protest, even if doing so results in more
violence. Finally, in societies where behavioral visibility is high due to the existence of
closely-spaced, extended family houses lacking walls, perpetrators of violence may
experience reputational damage, which could negatively impact the aggressor’s
involvement in reciprocal sharing networks or future prospects in the mating market.
A path model and hypotheses regarding the frequency of spousal violence
Figure 5.1 displays a path model of variables hypothesized to have direct and
indirect effects on the frequency of spousal violence against Tsimane’ women. Squares
and circles indicate measured and latent variables, respectively.
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Figure 5.1. A path model of spousal violence

Within a marriage spousal ages covary perfectly. Spousal ages should be
positively associated with the degree of joint offspring dependency during the couple’s
reproductive years, defined here as the number of surviving children born to the couple
under age 10. The man’s age is hypothesized to increase the likelihood of having
dependent children from polygynous marriage. Rather than marrying two women
simultaneously, polygynous Tsimane’ men generally enter one union and begin
developing relations with another woman (usually the wife’s eldest unmarried sister) after
several years of marriage. Once the man becomes polygynous, his co-wives usually
reside in separate residences with their respective children. The woman’s age is
hypothesized to increase the likelihood of having co-resident dependents from prior
marriage. In addition, the woman’s age should be negatively related to the likelihood of
residing in the same household cluster as consanguineal kin (i.e., biological parents and
full siblings). This is due to the nature of Tsimane’ post-marital residence patterns (see
Methods).
Matrilocal residence is hypothesized to have a direct negative effect on the
frequency of spousal violence due to greater costs to men of abusing wives (Counts et al.,
1999; Erchak, 1984; Figueredo et al., 2001). Using similar reasoning, matrilocal
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residence is hypothesized to have an indirect negative effect on rates of spousal violence
through reductions in marital strife and paternal disinvestment. The provisioning model
of marriage suggests fewer spousal conflicts over resource allocation as couples
reproduce and invest in joint offspring. We therefore hypothesize that joint offspring
dependency will negatively impact violence frequency directly and indirectly through
reductions in marital strife and paternal disinvestment.
The existence of a woman’s co-resident dependents from prior marriage and a
man’s non-resident dependents from polygynous marriage are hypothesized to increase
levels of marital strife due to greater spousal conflict over resource allocation. The
woman’s age is also hypothesized to negatively impact levels of marital strife. This is
because the frequency of spousal complaints over resource allocation, particularly due to
suspected infidelities, is expected to decrease with age.
Martial strife, in turn, is hypothesized to increase levels of paternal disinvestment.
Greater marital strife can signal imminent termination of the relationship, leading men to
shift investment in reproduction toward mating effort and family formation rather than
investing in soon-to-be estranged offspring. The woman’s age is also hypothesized to
influence paternal disinvestment. If the primary motivation behind men’s decision to
enter long-term reproductive relationships is to maintain access to women’s fertility (the
mating effort model of marriage), then we should expect paternal disinvestment to
increase as wives lose reproductive value. Husbands of aging women should increasingly
bias resource allocation towards enhancing fertility through direct or indirect pursuit of
extramarital affairs. Paternal disinvestment is also hypothesized to be greater among
polygynously married men simultaneously directing resources away from one household
and toward dependent offspring residing in another household. Finally, paternal
disinvestment, indicated by men’s involvement in extramarital affairs, village
absenteeism from wage labor, and store-bought alcohol consumption, is expected to have
a direct positive effect on rates of spousal violence.
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Methods
The ethnographic setting and the study area
The Tsimane’ are a natural fertility population of forager-farmers inhabiting the
rainforests and savannas located between the towns of San Borja and San Ignacio de
Moxos in the Beni department of lowland Bolivia. Almost all of their food comes from
foraging and slash-and-burn horticulture. Census estimates range from 6,351 to 7,130
(INE, 2003; VAIPO, 1998). Villages vary in their degree of access to markets and
interaction with other Bolivians, and acculturation mainly occurs through visits to San
Borja and men’s wage labor with loggers and ranchers.
Tsimane’ villages are composed of household clusters, each of which typically
contains three or four residences composed of consanguineal and affinal kin. Households
cooperate in economic pursuits and the extended family is the foundation of sociality.
There are no formal rules of post-marital residence, but newly married couples often
reside near the wife’s natal kin for at least a few years. During this time the husband
works with affinal kin in subsistence tasks, although bride service is not officially
recognized. After several years the couple and their joint children often relocate to live
near the husband’s family.
Marriages are generally facilitated by kin but women do not face divorce
restrictions. Upon remarriage, women sometimes send weaned offspring from prior
unions to live with maternal grandparents living in the same community. For men,
divorce and remarriage usually entails switching communities. Therefore, the probability
of conflict occurring with a current spouse over directing resources toward the man’s
children from previous marriages is fairly low.
There are no restrictions against polygyny but its occurrence is rare (5 – 10% of
men). Women consider men seeking only one wife to be more desirable as partners
(Gurven et al., In press). Other important characteristics of long-term mates for both
sexes include industriousness and a good character. Spouses engage in extensive
cooperation on a daily basis and sex roles are well-defined. Women exert considerable
domestic control and are responsible for providing childcare, processing food, cleaning
the house, washing clothes, preparing chicha (homemade beer), delegating household
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tasks to children, and weaving bags, floor mats, fans, and baskets. Men acquire game and
fish, engage in wage labor, construct houses, and manufacture bows, arrows, and canoes.
Both sexes collect forest foods, fetch firewood and water, engage in garden labor, and
manufacture roof panels made of woven palm leaves for household use or for sale in the
market.
Data were collected in two communities located in the Beni Biosphere Reserve
from August to November of 2007. Established in 1982, the Reserve is a nationally
protected area encompassing 1,350 km² and is home to roughly 1,200 Tsimane’ (Miranda,
1995). Use of the Reserve's natural resources is restricted to its inhabitants for
subsistence purposes. Since commercial logging is prohibited, wage labor opportunities
for men consist of serving as farm hands on ranches located outside of the Reserve. Men
usually travel alone, leaving their families in the village to tend gardens. Each of the
study villages contained a population of about 200 individuals. The villages are located
along the Maniqui River, which serves as the thoroughfare for many communities to the
market town of San Borja (population ~19,600).

The spousal conflict interview
Prior to fieldwork, JS obtained institutional IRB, community-wide, and individual
approval. Interviews were conducted in our field houses to maintain confidentiality. Part
one of the interview focused on complaints with spouses using a mixture of free list and
frequency rating methods. First, informants listed their most frequent complaints with a
spouse (without prompts), then rated the frequency with which they must demand a
partner to perform various sex-specific tasks. Participants also rated the frequency with
which a spouse must demand them to perform the relevant tasks.
The second part of the interview focused on violence. Women’s reproductive
histories were elicited to construct temporal intervals (e.g., pregnancies, interbirth
intervals) in which retrospective data were collected. After listing all pregnancies with
previous and current partners, women provided responses specific to each interval (see
Table 5.1). Questions pertaining to additional intervals were included that spanned the
couple’s first year of marriage (i.e. prior to the first pregnancy) and the last calendar year
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if a woman reached menopause. For each interval, informants stated the number of times
an abusive event occurred, defined as any physical contact initiated by the husband with
intent to harm the wife. To the extent possible, women also stated the causes surrounding
each abusive episode. At the end of the interview, participants were compensated with a
kilo of sugar, some soap, and several rifle bullets.

Table 5.1. Description of variables collected per interval
Variable
Woman’s age
Man’s age

Type

Codes

Continuous
Continuous

__
__

Proximity of woman’s natal kin

0 = woman’s nuclear family members not
resident in cluster
Dichotomous
1 = woman’s nuclear family member(s)
resident in cluster

Woman’s co-resident dependents
from prior marriage

0 = woman has no children < age 10 from
prior marriage
Dichotomous
1 = woman has children < age 10 from
prior marriage

Joint offspring dependency

Man’s non-resident dependents from
polygyny

Man’s complaints over woman’s
production (woman’s report;
includes childcare, cooking, sexspecific domestic work, and garden
labor)
Woman’s complaints over man’s
production (man’s report; includes
hunting, garden labor, sex-specific
domestic tasks, and childcare)

Dichotomous 0 = no joint children < age 10 present
1 = at least 1 joint child < age 10 present
0 = man has no children < age 10 with
other wife
Dichotomous
1 = man has children < age 10 with other
wife

Continuous1

0 = never complains
1 = rarely complains
2 = sometimes complains
3 = frequently complains

Continuous1

0 = never complains
1 = rarely complains
2 = sometimes complains
3 = frequently complains
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Table 5.1. Description of variables collected per interval (continued)
Variable

Man’s village absenteeism from
wage labor

Man’s store-bought alcohol
consumption

Man’s extramarital affair
involvement (woman’s report)

Type

Codes

Categorical

0 = never leaves community overnight
1 = rarely leaves community (<2 weeks)
2 = sometimes leaves community (>2
weeks but <1 month)
3 = frequently leaves community (>1
month)

Categorical

0 = rarely uses wage earnings to purchase
alcohol
1 = sometimes uses wage earnings to
purchase alcohol
2 = frequently uses wage earnings to
purchase alcohol

Dichotomous

0 = husband has no mistress
1 = husband has mistress

Outcome
Frequency of domestic violence
1

Continuous

__

Task-specific complaint ratings were summed to create a continuous measure

Age estimation and household composition
As part of a larger project focusing on Tsimane’ health and life history,
reproductive histories were collected by JS and another graduate student from 2006 to
2007 among 148 adults in the two sample communities. Birth years and genealogies
were assigned based on a combination of methods used elsewhere (Blurton Jones et al.,
2002; Hill and Hurtado, 1996; Howell, 1979). These include using known ages from
written accounts, relative age lists, dated events, and cross-validation of information from
independent interviews of kin (for a thorough description see Gurven et al., 2007).

Data analysis
The path analysis database consisted of a row per interval, which was assigned a
year by indexing the reproductive history dataset. Using EQS software version 6.1,
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marital strife and paternal disinvestment latent factors were created using the indicator
variables in the path model. Path analysis was then conducted specifying a maximum
likelihood estimation method. To further explore the likelihood of violence occurring by
cause, multinomial logistic regression was conducted on a reduced dataset using SPSS
version 16 (see Discussion). For this analysis the dataset consisted of a row for either an
abusive event with an unambiguous cause or an interval in which no violence occurred.
The outcome was expressed as a categorical variable with four levels: one level for no
abuse occurring during the interval (0=reference category), and three levels representing
women’s stated cause of the violent event (1=husband’s jealousy, 2=wife’s jealousy, and
3=husband’s complaints over wife’s work).

Results
The path analysis sample consisted of 53 women providing 787 intervals during
marriage. Women’s age at first marriage ranged from 13 to 24 years with a mean age of
17 years. Nearly half of participants remarried, with 20 women providing responses for
first and second marriages (204 intervals for second marriages), and four women
providing responses relating to first, second, and third marriages (eight intervals for third
marriages).
Two regressions were conducted to assess the reliability of informant responses.
There was no effect on the length of time since the first year of marriage on the number of
abusive events in the first year (t = -0.747, p = 0.458, n = 53), nor was any effect found
including all years of marriage (t = 0.694, p = 0.488, n = 787).

Marital strife
Women often complain about the timely completion of men’s subsistence tasks,
such as providing meat and working in gardens (Table 5.2). Instead of working men
usually visit kin or politick with unrelated individuals, especially while drinking chicha.
Men’s alcohol consumption, in and away from the community, is another frequent
complaint among wives since men often squander wage earnings in town on liquor.
Anecdotal reports of Tsimane’ women hiding money from inebriated husbands wishing to
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buy more liquor in the community from traveling river merchants are common (cf. Gallin,
1999).
Accusations of husbands having girlfriends, either in the community, in other
villages, or in San Borja, represent another recurrent complaint among wives. Oftentimes
the girlfriend in the village (perceived or real) is the wife’s eldest unmarried sister, who
lives in close proximity to the couple early in the marriage. Another frequent complaint
among women concerns men’s village absenteeism due to involvement in wage labor.
Frustrations stem from a combination of men not fulfilling traditional subsistence roles,
women experiencing feelings of loneliness, and women disliking the company of in-laws
when few consanguineal kin are present. Perhaps most importantly, unlike men’s
subsistence labor, women are unable to exert much control over men’s earnings. Wives
and children often do not accompany men during overnight stints of wage labor, which
can range from a few days to several weeks. Indeed, men’s self-reports of daily wages
and women’s estimates of their husbands’ wages are weakly correlated (r = 0.24, p =
0.17, n = 36). Men report a higher mean daily wage, but the difference is not statistically
significant (paired t = 0.191, p = 0.85).
Table 5.2. “What are your most frequent complaints to your spouse?” (free list)
Women (n=16)
Complaint
No meat
Does not work in field
Drinks too much
Has a girlfriend
Wage labors too often
Poor spending habits
Does not get firewood
Does not fetch water
Gossiping in-laws
Does not fix house
Often sick and cannot work

Men (n=16)
% listing
complaint
64
64
32
27
14
14
14
9
9
5
5

80

Complaint
Does not cook
Does not wash clothes
Does not bring water
Does not bring firewood
Does not make chicha
Visits family too much
Does not work in field
Does not clean house
Does not care for children

% listing
complaint
94
56
31
25
25
25
13
13
13

For men, frequent complaints about wives are also over sex-specific daily
economic activities. Instead of performing these tasks women are usually engaged in
other work or visiting family, which also represents a common complaint among men.
Squabbles over visitation of relatives are not confined to co-resident kin either – spouses
argue over visiting in-laws in other communities as well for various reasons (e.g., to help
clear fields, deliver money for trips to the San Borja hospital). These arguments
undoubtedly underscore disputes over residence decisions that occur throughout marriage.
Men also express dissatisfaction with the quality of care that wives provide to joint
children. Most childcare complaints are over allowing children to get too dirty (by
crawling or eating dirt), or physically punishing disobedient children too severely. In the
latter case, many Tsimane’ men believe that using too much force while reprimanding can
lead to illness.

Spousal violence
Selected sample characteristics are displayed in table 5.3. The lifetime prevalence
of violence in our sample was 85%, while the prevalence in 2007 was 40%. Figure 5.2
shows how the frequency of spousal violence and number of dependents change with the
wife’s age. The number of dependent offspring increases until there are as many children
reaching age 10 as there are new children being born. This rate stabilizes from the mid
20s to the early 40s, and begins to decline as women cease reproducing. Frequency of
violence is greatest at earlier ages, with women under the age of 20 experiencing abuse at
a rate of over two times greater (2.18 times/year, n = 158 person years) than their older
counterparts (1.01 times/year, n = 629 person years).
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Table 5.3. Selected descriptive measures of spousal violence dataset
Wife’s age
<20
20 – 24
25 – 29
30 – 34
35 – 39
40 – 44
45+

N women
48
45
38
32
26
19
13

N intervals
158
182
149
127
102
49
20

N women abused
30
32
24
17
9
8
2

Mean # of times abused/year

% of intervals abused
54
45
42
28
22
35
20

# of dependents
3.5
3

2

2.5
1.5

2
1.5

1

1
0.5

# of dependents

Mean # of times abused/year

2.5

0.5

0

0
<20

20 - 24

25 - 29

30 - 34

35 - 39

40 - 44

45+

Wife's Age

Figure 5.2. Frequency of violence and number of dependents by the wife’s age

Table 5.4 displays intercorrelations among indicator variables in the path model.
To obtain correlations between frequency of violence and latent variables (not shown),
we calculated factor scores by summing the product of standardized values of indicator
variables and factor loadings. Frequency of spousal violence is more strongly correlated
with the paternal disinvestment factor score (r = 0.487, p < 0.001) than it is with the
marital strife factor score (r = 0.145, p < 0.001).
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Table 5.4. Correlation matrix among indicator variables

Table 5.4. Correlation matrix among indicator variables
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Figure 5.3 displays results of the path analysis. Standard goodness of fit measures
indicate that results should be interpreted with caution (χ² = 398.03, df = 42, p<0.001,
RMSEA = 0.104, CFI = 0.812). For the RMSEA (root mean square error of
approximation) and CFI (comparative fit index), it has been argued that values greater
than 0.08 and lower than 0.9, respectively, indicate that the model does not adequately
represent the data (Browne and Cudeck, 1992). These goodness of fit measures,
however, do not greatly affect our interpretation of the results. The poor fit of the model
is due to relatively high covariance among 11% of standardized residuals. High
covariance results from lack of independence across years of data on the same woman.
To address this issue, we conducted generalized estimating equations (GEE) analyses to
obtain valid standard errors and p-values for estimates of each regression effect specified
in the path model. GEE modeling permits data analysis of correlated, repeated measures
on the same individuals over time (Liang and Zeger, 1986). We found few differences
with respect to the uncertainty surrounding regression effect estimates generated from
path and GEE analyses (see Notes).

Figure 5.3. Results of path analysis (standardized path coefficients inserted; asterisks
indicate significance at the 5% level; line thickness determined by absolute value of path
coefficients)
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Married women are significantly less likely to live near natal kin with age,
indicating a bias toward matrilocality early in the marriage. Both the man’s and woman’s
ages have positive, significant effects on the number of surviving dependents born to the
couple. A significant decline in child dependency as offspring age and couples cease
reproducing is found after including age and a quadratic age effect for each sex in
separate regression models (GEE analyses not shown).
As hypothesized, matrilocal residence significantly reduces levels of marital strife,
although this result should be interpreted with caution (see Notes) and warrants
replication. The fact that matrilocal residence exhibits a stronger negative correlation to
women’s rather than men’s complaints (Table 5.4) suggests that women’s natal kin
reduce spousal conflict over men’s parental investment decisions. This might occur
through increased male investment in the family or greater net resource flows to the
couple in the presence of the wife’s affinal kin. Marital strife also significantly decreases
with the woman’s age, indicating that concern over paternity is responsible for some
conflict. Indeed, the wife’s age negatively predicts the man’s complaints over the
woman’s production (GEE B = -0.029, p = 0.048) controlling for age difference
(husband’s age – wife’s age) as a measure of the man’s age. But the man’s age (i.e., age
difference) has no effect on the woman’s complaints over the man’s production (GEE B =
0.04, p = 0.447) controlling for the wife’s age. This indicates that the negative effect of
the woman’s age on marital strife is not being driven by the man’s age. However, there is
no significant negative effect of the wife’s age on the marital strife factor score (GEE B =
-0.01, p = 0.144) controlling for age difference. This suggests that the reduction in
marital strife is partially driven by aging women expressing fewer complaints to husbands
over the man’s production (also see Table 5.4).
As hypothesized, marital strife significantly increases paternal disinvestment.
Results should be interpreted with caution (see Notes), but this suggests that spousal
conflict over household resource allocation prompts men to bias investment in
reproduction toward mating rather than parenting effort given signs of impending
termination of the marriage. This also suggests that a recursive model allowing for
bidirectional pathways between marital strife and paternal disinvestment is appropriate,
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since greater marital strife might initiate a cycle of increased paternal disinvestment
followed by greater marital strife, etc. Paternal disinvestment is also significantly
reduced when men reside near affines, suggesting that matrilocal residence raises the cost
to men of directing resources outside of the nuclear family. Paternal disinvestment also
significantly declines with the woman’s age. This finding runs directly counter to the
prediction generated by the mating effort model of marriage. Despite the waning
reproductive value of the wife, men are less likely to divert resources from families and
engage in affairs as both members of the couple age and have children. The reproductive
lives of men and women instead appear linked through complementary roles, providing
support for the idea that the ultimate goal of men’s decisions to enter marriage is to
increase offspring quality (cf. Winking et al. 2007).
All three variables hypothesized to have a direct effect on rates of violence are
significant and in the predicted direction. Frequency of spousal violence decreases when
the couple resides in close proximity to the wife’s natal kin. Matrilocal residence,
therefore, reduces the frequency of abuse directly and indirectly through respective
reductions in marital strife (although tentative) and paternal disinvestment. Effect
decomposition of the proximity of the wife’s natal kin and other variables on abuse
frequency is shown in table 5.5. As hypothesized, joint offspring dependency also
significantly lowers the frequency of spousal violence, providing further support for the
provisioning model of marriage. Paternal disinvestment significantly increases the
frequency of violence and has the strongest total effect of all variables in the model. We
now consider the implications of these findings and limitations of this study.
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Table 5.5. Effect decomposition of variables on spousal violence frequency (standardized
values)
Variable

Direct
effect

Woman’s age
Man’s age
Proximity of woman’s natal kin
Woman’s co-resident dependents from prior
marriage
Joint offspring dependency
Man’s non-resident dependents from
polygyny
Marital strife
Paternal disinvestment

Indirect
effect
-0.172
-0.018
-0.169
-0.006

Total
effect
-0.172
-0.018
-0.291
-0.006

-0.015
0.033

-0.154
0.033

_____

0.092

0.576

_____

0.092
0.576

_____
_____

-0.122
_____

-0.139
_____

Discussion
A thorough understanding of spousal conflict and the conditions under which
violence is more likely to occur will consider the interaction between household
demography and resource allocation. Consistent with previous reports, we find that close
proximity of the wife’s natal kin directly reduces the frequency of violence (Counts et al.,
1999; Erchak, 1984; Figueredo et al., 2001). We also reveal a mechanism responsible for
the association: matrilocal residence results in less conflict over men’s parental
investment decisions, highlighting the increasing costs to men of familial maltreatment
when affines are present. Our results also add to the growing body of evidence in
traditional and modern societies that the presence of joint offspring stabilizes marital
relations by directly lowering rates of spousal violence. While this supports the
provisioning model of marriage, our hypotheses that joint offspring presence indirectly
lowers rates of violence through reductions in marital strife and paternal disinvestment
were not strongly supported.
In contrast to previous reports (Daly et al., 1993, 1997), we find no evidence that
presence of the wife’s children from previous marriage contributes to the risk of femaledirected partner violence. We suggest that the expected conflict over resource allocation
in step-families often found in modern societies is mitigated in horticultural and other
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subsistence-level societies where younger children have several opportunities to
contribute to household production.
This study highlights the need for further research into assessing the relative
importance of men’s versus women’s jealousy in precipitating spousal violence. The
finding that younger Tsimane’ women are at greater risk is consistent with the idea that
men’s jealousy plays a noteworthy role (e.g., Counts et al. 1999; Daly and Wilson 1988;
Goetz 2008). While we do not doubt the significance of men’s paternity concerns, we
argue that women’s concerns over men’s withdrawal of parental investment must also be
incorporated into models of spousal conflict and violence.
Tsimane’ women’s reports indicate that the most frequent trigger of abusive
events is women’s accusations of a partner’s infidelity (Table 5.6). In contrast, men’s
allegations of the wife’s extramarital sexual behavior account for less than 20% of violent
episodes. The likelihood of abuse occurring due to women’s concerns of men’s resource
diversions from the nuclear family is independent of the wife’s age when paternal
disinvestment is high (Table 5.7 and Figure 5.4). In contrast, the probability of abuse due
to men’s sexual jealousy when paternal disinvestment is high exhibits a predictable
significant decline as the wife’s reproductive value decreases. This strongly suggests that
women’s concerns over paternal disinvestment, rather than men’s concerns over
paternity, is responsible for the maintenance of violence throughout marriage. In
addition, the hypothesis that spousal violence occurs due to concerns over paternity
suggests that rates of abuse will increase during pregnancy. Yet the wife’s pregnancy
status has no effect on the likelihood of being abused due to the man’s jealousy (Table
5.7).
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Table 5.6. Stated causes of abusive episodes
Women’s reports (n = 292 episodes)
% of total
1) Wife complains about another woman
36
2) Husband complains about wife's productiona
29
3) Husband complains about another man
17
4) Wife complains about husband's drinking
5
5) Wife complains about living far from natal kin
4
6) Husband complains about disobedient step-children
2
7
7) Miscellaneous b
a
Includes all instances of the wife’s inability to perform domestic tasks (e.g., cooking, childcare,
washing clothes) due to her involvement in other work, infirmity, or a desire to visit kin.
b
Includes men’s complaints over reproduction (i.e., wife is infertile, miscarried, gave birth to a
girl and husband wanted a boy), wife’s attempts to stop a drunken husband from fighting another
man, wife’s misplacement of a tool, and husband’s inability to control his own behavior due to
severe inebriation.
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Table 5.7. Multinomial logistic regression of abuse by cause (women’s reports)

a

The reference category is an interval in which no abuse occurred (n=478).
Includes verbal doubts of paternity and boyfriend accusations.
c
Includes girlfriend accusations and complaints over men’s drinking.
b
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Expected Probability of Abuse Per Year

Husband's jealousy

Wife's jealousy

Wife's Work

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
Age of Wife

Figure 5.4. Likelihood of abuse by cause when paternal disinvestment is high (i.e.,
village absenteeism=3, affair involvement=1, and consumption of store-bought
alcohol=2; expected probabilities are calculated using estimates obtained from
multinomial logistic regression using sample means for controls; each equation is
compared to the reference category of no violence occurring per interval)
In our model men’s village absenteeism is an indicator of paternal disinvestment,
which is hypothesized to directly increase rates of violence. Yet it is also reasonable to
conclude that village absenteeism raises the risk of violence due to the man’s jealousy (B
= 0.431, p = 0.01 in Table 5.7). This would result from heightened potential for
cuckoldry during the man’s absence and attempts to reduce reproductive costs through
coercion. We suspect, however, that village absenteeism has a greater influence on
women’s concerns over paternal disinvestment than men’s concerns over paternity.
Because Tsimane’ villages are composed of closely spaced houses lacking walls,
residential privacy is extremely limited. This helps ensure that many behaviors remain
conspicuous, with possibilities for reputational damage ever-present through community
gossip. Such scrutiny limits the potential for women’s extramarital sexual exploits, and
provides avenues of information to absent men regarding the wife’s behavior. In stark
contrast, women have hardly any knowledge of solitary men’s behavior during wage
labor, and men’s temptations to direct resources from the family are largely unchecked.
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The extent to which men’s expenditures are directed toward increasing familial welfare
(e.g., buying medicine, clothing) versus enhancing fertility at the expense of the family
will better reveal men’s motivations for wage labor participation. But the fact that time
allocation to wage labor peaks from ages 20 to 24, when many men are married and have
few dependents, suggests that familial provisioning is not the ultimate goal of men’s
market involvement.
Several limitations of our study must be noted. We are unable to disentangle
men’s overt jealousy (as expressed to wives) from jealousy manifested in more subtle
ways. For example, in some cases the man’s complaints over the wife’s production might
represent suspicions of a partner’s sexual infidelity. This would underestimate the effect
of men’s jealousy on rates of violence. In their descriptions of abusive events due to the
wife’s inability to perform a task, Tsimane’ women sometimes quoted angry husbands as
saying, “I’m hungry and there is no food! Why weren’t you cooking? Were you
spending time with a boyfriend?” Indeed, the wife’s age negatively predicts the
probability of being abused due to her production (Table 5.7). Whether men’s concerns
over a partner’s extramarital sexual exploits are real or even sincere, however, is another
question. Of those men who acknowledged having ideas about a wife’s affairs in the year
prior to interviews, only 13% were actually able to provide a potential lover’s name (both
of which were ex-husbands of their wives living in distant communities). In contrast, of
those women who acknowledged having ideas about a husband’s affairs in the year prior
to interviews, 63% provided names of potential mistresses. Further research is required
to examine the extent to which female partner-directed violence stems from men’s sexual
jealousy as opposed to a desire to increase household efficiency.
Because causation cannot be directly inferred, we cannot rule out the possibility
that paternal disinvestment might be an outcome of violence. Moreover, the strong
correlation between men’s disinvestment and violence might reflect the fact that
philandering men are also more abusive or more likely to select partners tolerating abuse.
Finally, even if paternal disinvestment triggers violence, the effect might not be direct and
the mechanism remains unclear. Do wives punish disinvesting husbands by reducing
work effort, which then results in angry husbands resorting to violence? Do men
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preemptively abuse in order to minimize the frequency of women’s complaints over
future paternal disinvestment?
Overall, factors affecting variation in the degree of spousal conflict are essential to
our understanding of the causes of violence in relationships. Across cultures, our results
imply that the nature and distribution of resources influence spousal relations vis-à-vis
their impact on men’s parental investment decisions. Given the extensive focus on the
effects of patriarchy and men’s sexual jealousy on spousal violence against women, it is
unclear how or to what extent women’s marital dissatisfaction stemming from men’s
withdrawal of parental investment motivates men’s desires to suppress women’s
complaints through violence. This study represents a preliminary step in this direction.
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Notes
1. The following table compares standard errors and p-values of regression effect
estimates generated from path and GEE analyses:

Table 5.8. Comparison between standard errors and p-values of regression effect
estimates generated from path and GEE analyses.

a

Output from EQS software indicates whether p < 0.05 but does not specify exact values.
Due to the high correlation between women’s and men’s ages (r = 0.71), age difference
(husband’s age – wife’s age) was used as a measure of the man’s age after controlling for
the woman’s age.
c
Factor scores were obtained by summing the product of standardized values of
indicators and factor loadings.

b

94

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The goal of this dissertation was to explore the conditions under which
intrafamilial allocation of labor and resources results in conflict due to divergent interests
of household members. To investigate conflicts of interest between parents and children,
we generated predictions from parent-offspring conflict theory regarding individual,
familial, and task characteristics affecting variation in the likelihood of delegation and
resistance following delegation. To investigate spousal conflicts of interest, we
considered individual and relationship characteristics that affect the costs and benefits to
men of allocating reproductive resources for mating effort at the expense of parenting
effort.

Summary of Results
Parent-offspring conflict and task delegation
In chapter three we find evidence of conflict and cooperation due to an interaction
between the child’s age and family labor demand. Controlling for other factors,
household need positively influences the likelihood of delegation and, to some degree,
resistance toward performing delegated tasks. In addition, high exertion labor and tasks
primarily benefiting the family are more likely delegated and resisted than low exertion
labor and tasks primarily benefiting the child. This suggests that parental manipulation of
the child’s time occurs to foster greater levels of kin-directed altruism and is consistent
with the hypothesis that parent-offspring conflict is more likely to occur over productive
tasks that have fewer positive effects on parental fitness.
We also find evidence of increasingly convergent interests between parent and
child as the cost of task performance decreases with age and the benefits of the child’s
labor increase. An increase in family labor demand with age results in a significantly
lower likelihood of delegation and a marginally lower likelihood of resistance. In
addition, as paternal absence increases the value of labor substitution we find that
children are less likely delegated high exertion tasks and family-directed labor.
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Labor demand, children’s time use, and implications for family conflict and cooperation
In chapter four we find that as the number of younger siblings increases children
exhibit a tendency to increase production, but only with respect to kin-directed tasks.
While effects of increasing labor demand on time allocation to ego-directed production
are less consistent, we find evidence that number of younger siblings negatively predicts
time allocation to manufacture, a productive task heavily weighted against generating
short-term benefits used to invest in sibling welfare. We also find that number of
younger siblings negatively predicts time allocation to non-productive activities including
socializing and idling. Since these activities are often children’s preferred alternatives to
performing delegated work (see chapter three), we consider the possibility that increasing
labor demand results in greater parent-offspring conflict over optimal levels of children’s
kin-directed altruism. Indeed, we find that number of younger siblings significantly
lowers the probability of being in close proximity to the mother in/around the house while
not working. If parental manipulation of the child’s time entails engaging in sub-optimal
levels of kin-directed production from the child’s perspective, then maternal avoidance
might represent an attempt to combat behavioral manipulation by lowering the risk of
task delegation and creating opportunities to engage in ego-directed productive or nonproductive pursuits.

Spousal violence and paternal disinvestment
In chapter five we find that marital strife stems largely from the failure of one
partner to meet expectations of the other partner with respect to performance of daily
subsistence tasks. Divergent spousal interests over the proper use of familial time and
resources are highlighted by women’s frequent complaints over men’s dissipation of
resources through the squandering of scare wages on goods detracting from familial
welfare (particularly alcohol), extramarital affair involvement, and village absenteeism
due to wage labor. While we find some evidence that men’s sexual jealousy plays a
noteworthy role in precipitating violence against women, we argue that consideration of
women’s concerns over paternal disinvestment must be incorporated into models of
spousal violence. Based on interrelationships between the wife’s age, joint offspring
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dependency, paternal disinvestment, and violence, we find support for the idea that the
ultimate goal of men’s decisions to enter long-term unions is to increase offspring quality
rather than maintain access to women’s fertility. Finally, matrilocal residence is found to
decrease rates of spousal violence via direct and indirect routes. Together, this suggests
that individual, relationship, and local ecological factors must all be considered in order
to understand resource allocation decisions and factors increasing the risk of spousal
conflict.

Future Research
Parent-offspring conflict
There is little doubt that task delegation facilitates on-the-job training and is a
means by which parents prime children about the timing of participation in household
production. Our analyses indicate that delegation also ensures that children perform
productive tasks for which they show little initiative for. The general hypothesis that task
assignment is the result of parent-offspring conflict therefore merits further attention,
particularly due to the fact that children are assigned responsibilities that they are unlikely
to encounter with regularity as adults.
Child-focused research is necessary to reveal differences in preference over the
allocation of labor between parents and offspring and between siblings. Ironically, much
of this dissertation was concerned with the role of the child’s initiative in how labor is
divided yet little systematic attempt was made to actually ask children! Are there certain
productive tasks that children enjoy more than others? Do older children employ capable
younger siblings as substitute laborers in order to pursue self-interests, and to what extent
does this lead to sibling conflict? How might children actively attempt to minimize
opportunity costs of skill acquisition during task performance? Do they insist, for
example, that delegated family-oriented labor be conducted among peers? The fact that
Tsimane’ children often engage in horticultural labor not in isolation but in the presence
of siblings or other playmates suggests that parents and children might reach a
compromise between efficiency in task performance and the acquisition of social or other
abilities generating long-term benefits.
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We also know very little about the extent to which children’s independent
productive decisions are consistent with parental desires. If a task is completed but not
delegated, is it because the child is not supposed to be doing it? How might parents
discourage involvement in productive activities for which children do not have sufficient
strength or skill? Under what conditions might independent task performance result in
punishment?
Methodological refinements can also be made with respect to assessing the
physical cost associated with task performance. Utilizing heart rate monitors to estimate
energy expenditure coupled with structured interviews to assess independent versus
delegated task performance would permit comparisons of the extent to which short-term
physical costs of altruism are “tolerated” from the parent and child’s perspective.

Spousal violence
Sexual jealousy and paternal disinvestment models generate different predictions
about the conditions under which spousal violence against women occurs. For example,
if violence is primarily motivated by paternity uncertainty then we would expect abuse
during pregnancy to be more severe than at other times. We might also expect men to
strategically apply force to areas of the pregnant wife’s body in such a way that increases
the likelihood of harming the fetus. The paternal disinvestment model, in contrast, does
not imply that the severity of abuse will vary by the wife’s pregnancy status, or that men
will direct beatings to specific areas of the wife’s body.
To date, we also know very little about the frequency of women’s extramarital
affairs in traditional societies. The fact that only 13% of Tsimane’ men who recently
acknowledged entertaining ideas of a wife’s affairs could provide a potential lover’s name
suggests that the prevalence of coercive constraint due to concerns of paternity might be
somewhat exaggerated in small-scale, kin-based societies. Also suggestive is the fact that
men’s time allocation to wage labor outside of the community, and generally away from
the wife, peaks in the early 20s. If coercive control over the wife’s reproductive behavior
is the primary motivation behind spousal conflict and violence, then why are men
increasing the likelihood of cuckoldry when women are approaching peak fecundity?
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Conclusion
Household production is the result of inputs from a variety of members, each of
whom contains overlapping but non-identical interests. In this dissertation we questioned
the often overlooked assumptions that kin unconditionally pool resources and that
resource use is independent of the individual controlling allocation. In general, our
results show that at times self-interest may pervade relations of even the closest of kin.
This highlights a need for the development of models of family behavior that incorporate
children and parents as effective decision-makers capable of influencing outcomes with
respect to converging and diverging goals.
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